367 N.C. 51
N.C.2013Background
- Police arranged controlled buys on Mar. 3, Mar. 6, and Mar. 21, 2008; defendant drove the seller and received money; substances were alleged to be cocaine/crack.
- SBI testing: Agents Shoopman and Allcox performed tests on the Mar. 3 and Mar. 6 samples; Agent Schell personally tested only the Mar. 21 sample.
- At trial Schell testified as a forensic chemistry expert and read Shoopman’s and Allcox’s lab conclusions into the record and the lab reports were admitted into evidence over a Confrontation Clause objection.
- Defendant was convicted of multiple counts including conspiracies and sale/delivery; Court of Appeals vacated convictions related to Mar. 3 and Mar. 6 events and affirmed the Mar. 21 convictions.
- Supreme Court of North Carolina held Schell’s testimony constituted impermissible “surrogate testimony” under the Sixth Amendment for the Mar. 3 and Mar. 6 lab reports and that admission violated the Confrontation Clause; conspiracy convictions were reinstated; new trial ordered for the Mar. 6 sale/delivery count.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Craven's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of lab reports via substitute analyst — Confrontation Clause | Admission through an expert who reviewed reports is permissible if expert gives opinion based on data she reasonably relied on | Testimony repeating non-testifying analysts’ conclusions is testimonial hearsay and violates Sixth Amendment | Admission of Shoopman’s and Allcox’s lab conclusions through Schell violated Confrontation Clause (Bullcoming/Melendez-Diaz control) |
| Whether Schell gave an "independent" expert opinion | Schell reviewed reports and agreed with conclusions — thus offered an expert opinion based on data | Schell merely parroted other analysts’ conclusions and did not perform independent testing or analysis | Schell did not offer an independent opinion on Mar. 3 and Mar. 6 samples; her testimony was surrogate testimony and inadequate to satisfy Confrontation Clause |
| Harmless-error analysis for conspiracy convictions (Mar. 3 & Mar. 6) | Erroneous testimony was harmless because conspiracy proved by observed agreement and conduct | Error was prejudicial because lab results were central to substantive sales charges (but not to agreement element) | Error harmless as to conspiracy convictions; those convictions reinstated |
| Remedy for sale/delivery conviction (Mar. 6) | State: admission error does not require dismissal; at most new trial | Defendant: improper testimonial evidence requires reversal of conviction | Six-justice court split on harmlessness; Court orders a new trial for Mar. 6 sale/delivery conviction (vacatur by Court of Appeals replaced with remand for new trial) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (prohibits surrogate testimony of non-testifying forensic analyst where substitute gives no independent opinion)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forensic certification/reports prepared for prosecution are testimonial and trigger Confrontation Clause)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements generally inadmissible unless witness unavailable and defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality discussing limits on use of out-of-court statements and when expert testimony relying on such data may avoid confrontation problems)