State v. CoxÂ
253 N.C. App. 306
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- At ~2:37 a.m. on Nov. 28, 2011, Eric Jonathan Cox ran a red light and struck a vehicle driven by Hluon Siu, killing her and seriously injuring her 4‑year‑old son Khai; witnesses reported Cox speeding and not rendering aid.
- Officers arrested Cox at the scene for DWI and license restriction violation; he performed poorly on field sobriety tests and later consented to blood draw producing a .17 BAC.
- Cox was interviewed, waived Miranda rights, and was not initially presented to a magistrate until about seven hours after his arrest; a magistrate initially failed to set bond on the murder charge.
- Cox was tried and convicted of second‑degree murder, felonious serious injury by vehicle, DWI, and license‑restriction violation; he appealed, raising challenges including the magistrate‑delay dismissal claim and various evidentiary and jury‑instruction claims.
- On remand from an earlier appeal for additional findings on the magistrate‑delay claim, the trial court made supplemental factual findings and again denied Cox’s motion to dismiss; this appeal affirms that denial and rejects his other challenges.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Cox's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether charges must be dismissed for an "unnecessary delay" in presenting Cox to a magistrate | Delay (from arrest to magistrate ~7 hours) was spent on permissible tasks (medical clearance, blood draw, investigation); Cox had opportunities to contact counsel/witnesses and did not show prejudice | Seven‑hour delay and magistrate’s bond error violated statutory and constitutional rights, warranting dismissal | Denial of motion to dismiss affirmed: no irreparable prejudice shown; multiple opportunities to consult occurred and Hill prejudice rule does not automatically apply under current law (see Knoll) |
| Whether limiting cross‑examination of Khai’s father (Cooke) about his civil complaint was improper | Cooke’s testimony was limited to biographical/injury facts; complaint contents were irrelevant and would be improper impeachment/bias evidence | Cox wanted to show Cooke’s financial interest and bias via contents of the verified civil complaint | Court upheld exclusion: trial court acted within discretion; excluded matters were immaterial and did not influence verdict |
| Whether jury instructions on proximate cause and intervening negligence were erroneous | Instruction correctly stated proximate‑cause law and informed jury only that defendant’s negligence must be a proximate cause; intervening negligence not required absent request and no plain error shown | Instruction confused competing standards and failed to instruct on intervening negligence, harming Cox | No reversible error or plain error: instructions were accurate, overwhelming evidence that Cox’s impairment and failure to stop were proximate causes; any negligence by victim would be, at most, concurrent proximate cause |
| Whether evidence that the child was improperly restrained was admissible | Statutes bar seatbelt/child restraint evidence in criminal/civil trials (except for prosecution of seatbelt statute), so exclusion proper | Evidence of improper restraint was relevant to causation/severity and should have been admitted | Exclusion affirmed: statutory rules precluded admission and trial court did not abuse its discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547 (N.C. 1971) (refusal to allow post‑arrest contact with counsel/friends can be inherently prejudicial where it deprives defendant of ability to gather exculpatory witnesses)
- State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. 535 (N.C. 1988) (after statutory change making BAC .08 dispositive, prejudice from post‑arrest denial of access is not presumed; defendant must show actual prejudice)
- State v. Bailey, 184 N.C. App. 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (intervening negligence by victim, if any, may be only a concurrent proximate cause; instruction that defendant’s negligence need only be a proximate cause is proper)
- State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380 (N.C. 1979) (statutory magistrate‑presentation and post‑arrest communication requirements implicate constitutional protections; noncompliance can violate rights)