390 P.3d 44
Kan. Ct. App.2017Background
- Undercover detective arranged purchase of oxycodone and hydrocodone from Jennifer Curtis; Curtis told the detective her father (Ronald Cottrell) had the pills.
- At the meeting Curtis signaled Cottrell, who entered the detective’s car, handed over a pill bottle, took $350 cash, and returned to his truck; audio/video and still photos recorded the exchange.
- Texts from Curtis to the detective identified Cottrell as the supplier; subsequent texts showed Curtis describing her role as bringing customers, not handling money or product.
- Cottrell testified he believed he was collecting a $50 repayment and claimed he did not know the pills were illegal; he admitted not keeping the $350.
- Jury convicted Cottrell of distribution of oxycodone and hydrocodone and conspiracy to distribute; district court denied motions for acquittal/new trial and sentenced him.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Cottrell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury unanimity instruction required for conspiracy when multiple overt acts were alleged | No unanimity instruction required because overt acts are not distinct crimes; jury need only find an overt act in furtherance of the single alleged conspiracy | Multiple overt acts alleged; State should have elected an overt act or jury should have been instructed to be unanimous on which overt act supported conviction | Affirmed: overt acts in furtherance of one conspiracy are not "multiple acts" requiring election or a unanimity instruction under KS law |
| Whether the State presented sufficient evidence of an agreement for conspiracy | Evidence of texts identifying Cottrell as supplier, observed coordination and post-sale conversation supported an agreement inference | No direct communications between Cottrell and Curtis about drug sales; presence together insufficient to prove agreement | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to infer an agreement |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to prove Cottrell acted with requisite knowledge for distribution convictions | Video, photos, texts and conduct supported an inference Cottrell knowingly participated | Cottrell testified he thought he was collecting repayment and did not know transaction involved illegal pills | Affirmed: evidence viewed in the light most favorable to prosecution allowed a reasonable juror to find knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether the court erred by instructing mens rea as "knowingly" instead of "intentionally" for distribution | Instruction of "knowingly" was proper and defense counsel requested/accepted that language at conference | "Intentionally" is the required mental state; instructing "knowingly" was reversible error | Affirmed: no reversible error — defense counsel requested/approved the "knowingly" instruction and cannot invite error and later complain |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591 (framework for reviewing unanimity-instruction claims)
- State v. Enriquez, 46 Kan. App. 2d 765 (holding multiple overt acts in conspiracy do not require unanimity — court discussed but distinguished/declined to follow)
- State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102 (defining "multiple acts" context in unanimity analysis)
- State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422 (multiple acts must be factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all elements to constitute separate crimes)
- State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (framework for determining when statutory language creates alternative means)
- State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170 (statutory interpretation governs alternative means inquiry)
