State v. Cornman
237 Ariz. 350
Ariz. Ct. App.2015Background
- Police executed a search warrant at Cornman’s home; officers found 1.3 grams methamphetamine in a safe, digital scale, small baggies, meth pipes, a surveillance camera, an unloaded gun, and ammunition.
- Cornman was Mirandized, initially denied sales, then admitted limited sales to friends/family and said he had “a gram left.” At a later station interview he said “anything I might say might be used against me so I can’t say anything more,” but continued answering some questions before invoking counsel.
- Cornman moved to suppress the station statements and to exclude evidence of the search-warrant basis; the trial court denied suppression and allowed mention of a confidential informant in the interview for context while excluding the warrant’s supporting evidence.
- At trial the recorded station interview was played; the detective testified about local drug-selling indicia (scales, baggies, cameras, guns). Cornman testified, admitting personal use but denying sales and offering innocent explanations for items.
- Jury convicted Cornman of possession of dangerous drugs for sale; sentenced to a mitigated five-year term. Cornman appealed raising five issues including suppression, confidential informant references, corpus delicti instruction, sufficiency of evidence, and admission of a demonstrative PowerPoint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Motion to suppress station statements | State: statements were not an unambiguous invocation; admissible | Cornman: his “anything I might say…” statement invoked Miranda and required termination | Court: no abuse of discretion; invocation was ambiguous under Berghuis/Davis and statements admissible |
| 2. Reference to confidential informant in interview | State: needed for context; admissible as non-hearsay background (Boggs) | Cornman: disclosure violated Confrontation Clause and backdoored warrant support; should have been redacted | Court: no abuse of discretion; admission for context permitted with limiting instruction |
| 3. Corpus delicti corroboration instruction | State: jury instructions already covered evaluation of evidence | Cornman: jury should have been given explicit corroboration instruction before convicting on confessions | Court: no error; corroboration is a legal admissibility matter for judge (Jones/Dickerson) and jury received adequate instructions |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence for sale conviction | State: admission plus corroborating indicia sufficient | Cornman: evidence was insufficient to prove intent to sell | Court: substantial evidence supports conviction (admission + scale, baggies, camera, gun) |
| 5. Admission of demonstrative PowerPoint | State: demonstrative slides accompanied testimony, disclaimers made | Cornman: slides were undisclosed and misleading (depicted large quantities) | Court: no abuse of discretion; demonstratives admitted after disclaimer and foundation |
Key Cases Cited
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (ambiguous or equivocal invocations do not require police to cease questioning)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (clarifies ambiguous invocation standard)
- State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325 (2008) (videotaped interrogation admissible for context rather than truth)
- State v. Jones, 198 Ariz. 18 (2000) (corpus delicti corroboration is a legal question for the judge)
- U.S. v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (corroboration rule is for judge; no separate jury instruction required)
- State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484 (2013) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)