State v. Cornell, 103 A.3d 469

Background

Defendant convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 12‑year‑old (Apr. 24, 2012); PSI prepared listing ~32 "specialized" probation conditions but none were checked.
At sentencing the court imposed 2–6 years with 20 months to serve and ordered "all sexual offender conditions as mentioned in the PSI" without listing specific conditions in the oral ruling.
Court’s written probation order listed 21 restrictions and included a catch‑all: "You must abide by all sex offender conditions as directed by your probation officer." The order diverged from the PSI on at least one alcohol condition.
Defendant sought clarification and then objected to many PSI‑proposed conditions (e.g., restrictions on contact with minors, internet/computer/recording devices, search authority, plethysmograph testing, residence and employment restrictions).
This Court granted a limited remand for clarification; the trial court on remand adopted essentially the PSI conditions but declined to rule on defendant’s objections; procedural confusion followed over whether the trial court had authority to reconsider.
Supreme Court held defendant’s motion to reconsider was properly before the trial court and remanded for further proceedings to ensure conditions are individualized, reasonably necessary, and properly recorded in a probation certificate per statute and precedent.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were the sex‑offender/probation conditions sufficiently specific and individualized?	State: Routine practice supports imposing categorical conditions; defendant had notice and waived objections.	Defendant: Conditions were not identified or individualized; PSI boxes unchecked and oral/order wording vague.	Court: No adequate notice or individualization; remand to reconsider and insure necessity and relation to rehabilitation/public safety.
Did vague wording and delegation to PO violate due process / impermissibly delegate judicial authority?	State: Remand limited to clarification; delegation is routine.	Defendant: Catch‑all directing PO to impose conditions delegated judicial power and lacked specificity.	Court: Entry order appeared to delegate discretion to PO and failed to provide required explicit written notice; objections must be addressed.
Were certain conditions unduly restrictive/invasive (substantive due process)?	State: Conditions justified by offense category and public safety.	Defendant: Several conditions (e.g., bans on employment, residence, friendships, devices, mandatory plethysmograph) overly broad and invasive.	Court: Must determine whether each condition is "reasonably necessary" and reasonably related to preventing recurrence and aiding law‑abiding life; remand for factual consideration.
Were the conditions enforceable absent a proper probation certificate and compliant procedure?	State: Court’s remand was limited; issues belong in collateral relief if waived.	Defendant: Entry order failed to "explicitly set forth" conditions as required by 28 V.S.A. § 252(c); thus not enforceable.	Court: Conditions not enforceable unless included in probation certificate; court may correct clerical errors under Rule 36 and must issue proper notice.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hemingway, 97 A.3d 465 (Vt. 2014) (written probation certificate must explicitly set forth conditions to be enforceable)
State v. Rivers, 878 A.2d 1070 (Vt. 2005) (probation conditions must be reasonably related to public protection and assisting probationer to lead a law‑abiding life)
State v. Freeman, 70 A.3d 1008 (Vt. 2013) (probationer barred from collateral challenge if issue could have been raised on direct appeal; court may apply plain‑error review)
State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076 (Vt. 1996) (available methods to challenge probation conditions include challenge at sentencing, Rule 35 motion, or direct appeal)
State v. Morse, 106 A.3d 902 (Vt. 2014) (concurring opinion stressing need for clearer procedural rules for probation condition objections)