430 P.3d 169
Or. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant, on a cross-country trip, could not access restroom facilities and urinated against the side of a building in downtown Portland, causing urine to flow across the sidewalk and produce a stench.
- A private security employee observed the act, reported it, and police issued a citation for misdemeanor offensive littering under ORS 164.805(1)(a).
- ORS 164.805(1)(a) criminalizes creating an objectionable stench by intentionally "discarding or depositing any rubbish, trash, garbage, debris or other refuse" on a public way.
- Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at trial arguing public urination is not covered by that statute; the trial court denied the motion and the jury convicted.
- On appeal, the court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo under the PGE/Gaines methodology and considered dictionary definitions and statutory context.
- The majority reversed the conviction, holding that (1) "discarding" and (to an extent) "depositing" as used in the statute do not naturally encompass ordinary public urination, and (2) urine does not fit within the ordinary meanings of "rubbish, trash, garbage, debris or other refuse."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 164.805(1)(a) encompasses public urination | State: the statutory terms can be read broadly from dictionary definitions to include urine | Defendant: statutory language ("discarding or depositing" and listed kinds of "refuse") does not cover urination | Reversed: statute does not proscribe ordinary public urination because urine is not within the listed kinds of refuse and "discarding/depositing" do not naturally describe urination |
| Whether "discarding" includes urination | State: "discard" can be broad enough to include elimination of urine | Defendant: "discard" implies getting rid of something no longer useful; urination is bodily discharge, not discarding | Held: "discarding" does not include urination |
| Whether "depositing" includes urination | State: "deposit" has senses that could include letting fall by natural process | Defendant: "deposit" contextually implies placing refuse like litter, not bodily elimination | Held: Court not required to decide broadly but concluded "depositing" not reasonably read to encompass urination in context; majority treats deposit/sequence with listed refuse as limiting |
| How to construe the series "rubbish, trash, garbage, debris or other refuse" | State: "other refuse" and "any" argue for broad meaning to capture urine | Defendant: ejusdem generis and dictionary distinctions limit "other refuse" to items similar to listed categories (waste/rejected material) | Held: ejusdem generis and ordinary meanings limit "other refuse" to materials like rubbish/trash/garbage/debris; urine does not fit those ordinary meanings |
Key Cases Cited
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (set out statutory‑interpretation framework)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (statutory interpretation methodology)
- State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 261 P.3d 1234 (context limits reliance on dictionary definitions)
- State v. Carlton, 361 Or. 29, 388 P.3d 1093 (choose dictionary sense that best fits statutory context)
- State v. Essex, 215 Or. App. 527, 170 P.3d 1094 (ejusdem generis and interpreting "similar refuse")
- State v. Shifflett, 285 Or. App. 654, 398 P.3d 383 (ordinary meaning presumed from dictionary but must fit statutory context)