State v. Copeland, 2014 Ohio 5780

Ronald Copeland was indicted on multiple counts including first‑degree illegal manufacture of methamphetamine (charged at elevated degree for juvenile presence), illegal assembly/possession of chemicals, four counts of child endangering (each for a different child), aggravated possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of criminal tools, drug paraphernalia, and having weapons while under disability.
Copeland pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea to illegal manufacturing (F1), aggravated possession (F5), and four counts of child endangering (F3); the remaining counts were dismissed and a PSI was ordered.
Before sentencing Copeland moved to merge allied offenses for sentencing; at the hearing he argued only that the two drug counts should merge with each other and that the four child endangering counts should merge with each other.
The trial court merged the two drug counts together, declined to merge the child endangering counts, and sentenced Copeland to 8 years on manufacturing plus 2 years on each child endangering count, to run consecutively for a 16‑year total.
On appeal Copeland argued the trial court erred by failing to analyze whether the drug conviction(s) and the child‑endangering convictions were allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25 and controlling Ohio precedent; the Ninth District reversed and remanded for the trial court to conduct the allied‑offense analysis in the first instance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Copeland)	Held
Whether the trial court erred by failing to merge the drug conviction(s) with the child‑endangering convictions under Ohio's allied‑offense statute	The State argued the drug offenses and child‑endangering offenses were separate acts and dissimilar import, so they did not merge	Copeland argued all offenses arose from the same conduct and should merge; he asked for merger of counts for sentencing	Court held the trial court failed to analyze whether the drug and child‑endangering convictions were allied and remanded for the trial court to apply the allied‑offense test (reversed and remanded)
Whether invited‑error doctrine bars Copeland’s challenge	Not asserted as inviting the specific error	Copeland argued he did not actively cause the trial court’s omission and thus invited‑error does not apply	Court held invited‑error did not apply because defense counsel merely acquiesced and was not actively responsible for the error

State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 (2010) (R.C. 2941.25 requires the trial court to determine and merge allied offenses when plea agreement is silent)
State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 (2010) (sets analytical framework for allied‑offense merger under R.C. 2941.25)
State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 (2013) (defendant may raise allied‑offense merger on appeal even if not objected to at sentencing in certain contexts)
State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320 (2000) (explains invited‑error doctrine and that mere acquiescence is insufficient to invoke it)