State v. Coomes, 962 N.W.2d 510

Background

State charged Keith P. Coomes with first-degree felony assault and third-degree misdemeanor assault; jury acquitted on the misdemeanor and declared a mistrial on the felony on Sept. 12, 2019.
After mistrial the court set status hearings; defense repeatedly sought continuances from Oct. 22, 2019 through Jan. 17, 2020 because Coomes was recovering from a motorcycle injury (those days were attributed to Coomes).
The court sua sponte removed Coomes’ retained counsel (Worthman) and replacement counsel was appointed after a hearing on Feb. 11, 2020; replacement counsel said he needed time to review the file and filed discovery motions on March 10.
Status hearings on April 7 and May 12 reflected further scheduling with the parties’ consent; a pretrial on June 9 set retrial for Aug. 17–18, 2020, which Coomes expressly agreed to.
Coomes moved for absolute discharge on speedy-trial grounds on Aug. 10, 2020; at the hearing defense introduced exhibits and the State offered no evidence. The district court excluded several periods as excludable (including Jan 17–Apr 7, 2020) and denied discharge.
On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it found no plain error in the order of proof or reliance on defense-offered evidence, agreed that Feb. 11–Apr. 7 and Apr. 8–May 12 were excludable, and held the speedy-trial deadline had not expired when Coomes filed his motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by requiring defendant to present evidence first (burden/order of proof)	Court should have required State to present evidence first; presenting defense evidence first shifted burden	Trial court’s housekeeping question did not shift burden; order of proof is discretionary absent prejudice	No plain error; no burden shift and no prejudice shown
Whether the State failed to meet its burden because it presented no evidence at the discharge hearing	State must present evidence to prove excludable time; absence of State evidence means it failed its burden	State may rely on evidence/ admissions offered by defendant; defense exhibits can supply State’s proof	No plain error; State entitled to rely on defense-offered and received evidence
Whether the district court properly excluded Jan. 17–Apr. 7, 2020 as "good cause" under § 29-1207(4)(f)	All time after Jan. 17 was not excludable; no record support for "good cause" delay	Appointment of new counsel and counsel’s need to get "up to speed" created substantial reason to exclude time	Partially reversed: exclusion of Jan. 17–Feb. 11 was erroneous (no appointment until Feb. 11); exclusion of Feb. 11–Apr. 7 was supported as good cause (56 days excluded)
Whether other post-Feb. 11 periods were excludable (continuances/consent)	None of the later periods should be excluded	April 7–May 12 (and June 9–Aug. 17) were continuances with defense consent and therefore excludable	April 8–May 12 excluded as continuance (35 days); overall calculation left time remaining so motion was untimely; Coomes also waived remaining statutory rights by seeking discharge outside the statutory period

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hernandez, 959 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 2021) (defendant's motion statements can operate as judicial admissions that the State may rely on)
State v. Chapman, 949 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 2020) (method for computing six‑month speedy trial period)
State v. Dockery, 729 N.W.2d 320 (Neb. 2007) (mistrial restarts the speedy trial clock)
State v. Covey, 673 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2004) (pre‑trial motion that by its terms does not affect trial commencement is not a "period of delay")
State v. Kinstler, 299 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1980) (State bears burden to prove applicability of speedy‑trial exclusions; general "good cause" findings insufficient)
State v. Mortensen, 841 N.W.2d 393 (Neb. 2014) (defendant can waive remaining statutory speedy‑trial rights by conduct that causes continuance)