State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749

State charged Keith P. Coomes with first-degree and third-degree assault; jury returned guilty/not-guilty on the misdemeanor and declared a mistrial on the felony on Sept. 12, 2019, restarting the § 29-1207 speedy-trial clock.
From Oct. 22, 2019 to Jan. 17, 2020 the case was continued at Coomes’ request because of his motorcycle injuries (period conceded excludable).
The trial court sua sponte removed retained counsel (Worthman) by order entered Jan. 17; replacement counsel was appointed at the Feb. 11 status hearing; counsel represented he first met Coomes on March 10 and had not yet reviewed the file.
The court set a retrial date of Aug. 17–18, 2020 after a June 9 pretrial; Coomes agreed on the record to those dates.
Coomes moved for absolute discharge on statutory speedy-trial grounds on Aug. 10, 2020; at the hearing the defense offered exhibits, the State offered no live evidence, and the district court denied the motion, finding multiple periods excludable (including Jan. 17–Apr. 7, 2020).
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it held (a) no plain error in the order of proof or in the court’s reliance on defense-offered evidence, (b) the trial court erred in treating Jan. 17–Feb. 11 as excludable but did not clearly err in excluding Feb. 11–Apr. 7 for good cause, and (c) the period Apr. 7–May 12 was excludable as a continuance with defense consent, so the speedy-trial deadline had not passed when Coomes filed his motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Order of proof / burden at hearing	State: no claim of error; trial court preserved State’s burden	Coomes: court required defense to present evidence first, shifting burden	No plain error; order of proof discretionary and court correctly stated State bears burden
State presented no evidence at hearing	State may rely on evidence received by court, including defense exhibits	Coomes: State failed to meet its burden because it produced no evidence	Held for State: court may consider defense-offered evidence; State did not necessarily fail its burden
Excludability Jan. 17–Apr. 7, 2020 under § 29-1207(4)(f) (good cause)	State: appointment of replacement counsel and need to get up to speed created good cause	Coomes: no period of delay or evidentiary support for good cause	Split: Jan. 17–Feb. 11 not excludable (no counsel appointed until Feb. 11); Feb. 11–Apr. 7 excludable for good cause (new counsel needed time)
Excludability Apr. 7–May 12 and effect of setting Aug. 17 trial	State: Apr. 7–May 12 is excludable as continuance with defense consent; parties’ agreement to Aug. 17 tolls clock	Coomes: additional periods should count against State; no waiver/consent	Held: Apr. 8–May 12 excludable (defense consent at April 7 hearing); parties’ agreement to Aug. 17 further tolled the clock and Coomes’ motion was premature

State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835 (2021) (standards for appellate review of speedy-trial factual findings)
State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443 (2020) (method for computing six-month speedy-trial period)
State v. Dockery, 273 Neb. 330 (2007) (mistrial restarts speedy-trial clock)
State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 (1980) (trial court must make specific findings to exclude time for good cause)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (definition of good cause as substantial reason; factual, case-by-case inquiry)
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (2019) (excludable periods can arise from delays even if trial date unchanged)
State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (2014) (defendant may waive statutory speedy-trial rights by causing or consenting to delay)
State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145 (2004) (interpretation of "period of delay" in § 29-1207)