State v. Congress
198 Vt. 241
Vt.2014Background
- Latonia Congress was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing her 16-year-old niece, Shatavia Alford; medical evidence showed a deep stab wound inconsistent with a thrown knife.
- Several witnesses described a fight immediately before the killing; one witness reported Congress threatened to kill the victim.
- Defense presented extensive testimony of prolonged domestic abuse and called Dr. Philip Kinsler, who diagnosed acute stress disorder and dissociative amnesia, opining Congress dissociated and lacked conscious control.
- State rebuttal psychiatric testimony disputed a mental disease or defect causing incapacity and questioned whether dissociation occurred during the offense.
- At trial the court instructed jurors that evidence of a mental condition could (1) support an insanity acquittal if it met statutory criteria, or (2) negate the specific-intent element (leading to acquittal of murder and voluntary manslaughter), but refused to instruct that a non‑insanity mental condition that did not negate specific intent could nevertheless mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter.
- Congress also challenged exclusion of (a) a late‑disclosed witness (Copeland’s brother) proffered to impeach a state witness and (b) portions of her expert’s factual bases under V.R.E. 703; appeals followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Congress) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a jury convict for voluntary manslaughter based on a serious psychological condition that does not rise to insanity and does not negate specific intent? | Jury should convict per statutory elements; if intent proven beyond reasonable doubt, mitigation by mental condition that does not negate intent is not available. | Mental condition short of insanity can be an extenuating circumstance that mitigates murder to manslaughter even if it does not eliminate specific intent (diminished capacity as mitigation). | Trial court correctly refused instruction; diminished-capacity evidence is relevant only to negate intent (or support insanity); it cannot mitigate murder to manslaughter when intent is proved. Affirmed. |
| Does Vermont law treat “diminished capacity” as intent-negating or as an independent mitigating basis for manslaughter? | Treat as intent-negating (traditional approach tied to State’s burden to prove mens rea). | It can operate as mitigation (like heat-of-passion) allowing jury discretion to reduce degree even when intent exists. | Court holds the proper framework ties diminished-capacity evidence to its tendency to negate specific intent; prior language suggesting independent mitigation is disapproved. |
| Did the trial court abuse discretion by excluding Copeland’s brother as impeachment/character witness after late disclosure? | Exclusion proper under discovery rules; testimony was collateral or cumulative and defendant failed to make required offer of proof. | Late discovery was justified by recent deposition revelations; brother’s testimony would impeach contradictions and bear on credibility. | Exclusion was within trial court’s discretion; issues were collateral and discovery rules plus lack of offer of proof supported exclusion. |
| Did the court err under V.R.E. 703 by limiting Dr. Kinsler’s testimony about facts on which he relied? | Court reasonably limited expert to facts in evidence to prevent untested prejudicial hearsay; judge balanced probative value and prejudice. | Limitation crippled the expert’s ability to explain his opinion and required explicit Rule 703 balancing. | No reversible error: court conducted the required balancing, most factual bases were later admitted at trial, and defendant did not identify specific excluded facts that affected substantial rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 508 (clarifies manslaughter as intentional killing under extenuating circumstances and recommends avoiding the term "malice")
- State v. Duff, 150 Vt. 329 (recognizes diminished capacity as a means to negate malice/intent)
- State v. Shaw, 168 Vt. 412 (discusses diminished capacity as negating state of mind necessary for murder)
- State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302 (treats voluntary manslaughter as intentional killing under sudden passion or diminished capacity)
- State v. Blish, 172 Vt. 265 (explores distinguishing factor between murder and manslaughter as mitigating circumstances rather than differing intent)
- State v. Sexton, 180 Vt. 34 (2006 VT 55) (discusses both traditional intent-negating rationale and a suggested mitigation framework for diminished capacity)
- State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 413 (2010 VT 83) (reiterates two bases to mitigate murder to manslaughter: provocation and diminished capacity; requires nexus to intent formation)
- State v. Pelican, 160 Vt. 536 (concurring opinion advocating that diminished capacity be characterized as mitigation reducing murder to manslaughter)