State v. Collymore, 148 A.3d 1059

Background

On Jan. 18, 2010 a robbery attempt/shooting at Diamond Court resulted in the death of John Frazier; defendant Anthony Collymore was tried and convicted of felony murder, attempted robbery, conspiracy and firearm possession.
The state granted immunity to three prosecution witnesses (Rayshaun Bugg, Vance Wilson, and Jabari Oliphant) to compel their testimony in the state’s case-in-chief; each repudiated prior statements and testified favorably to Collymore at that time.
When the defense later sought to call those same witnesses in its case, the state refused to extend additional immunity; the witnesses asserted the Fifth and either declined to answer or were excused.
The trial court limited certain evidence (prior inconsistent statements, police-investigation testimony) to specific, non‑substantive uses and admitted some testimony about other alleged gun incidents; the jury convicted and the court sentenced Collymore to a lengthy term.
On appeal Collymore challenged (1) the state’s refusal to provide additional immunity / the court’s allowing witnesses to invoke the Fifth, (2) several evidentiary rulings (uncharged misconduct, impeachment with a cousin’s statement, police-investigation hearsay), and (3) sentencing comments allegedly penalizing him for going to trial.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Collymore's Argument	Held
Whether the state could “revoke” immunity or was required to grant additional immunity to prosecution witnesses when called by defense	State: it did not revoke existing immunity; it was not obligated to grant further immunity for new testimony beyond what was previously compelled	Collymore: refusal to extend immunity effectively revoked protection and denied him exculpatory testimony in violation of due process and compulsory process rights	Court: §54-47a transactional immunity, once granted, cannot be revoked; but the state need not grant additional immunity for new testimony and was not constitutionally required to do so
Whether the court should have compelled the three witnesses to testify during the defense case	State: witnesses lacked immunity for new matters; their Fifth Amendment claims could be valid	Collymore: because they had been immunized when compelled earlier, they could no longer invoke the Fifth for the same topics and should have been compelled	Court: sustaining some Fifth claims as to new, un‑immunized matters was proper; court erred in sustaining Fifth on repeated matters already compelled under §54-47a but error was harmless because testimony was cumulative
Admissibility of evidentiary rulings: uncharged misconduct (other gun incidents), impeachment via cousin’s testimony, and detective’s recounting of witness statements	State: evidence relevant (gun possession, impeachment, and investigative sequence); limited instructions addressed potential prejudice	Collymore: evidence was more prejudicial than probative, hearsay, and impermissible commentary on other witnesses	Court: evidentiary rulings were within discretion — prior inconsistent statement admissible for impeachment; investigator’s testimony admissible to explain police work (limited use); even if other‑act gun evidence borderline, any error was harmless given strength of the case
Whether sentencing remarks penalized defendant for exercising right to trial	State: sentencing comments addressed remorse, responsibility, and defendant’s record (legitimate sentencing factors)	Collymore: court’s remark that he didn’t accept responsibility punished him for going to trial	Held: context showed court addressed lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility, legitimate considerations; no constitutional sentencing penalty for trial found

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361 (Conn. 2006) (discusses theories requiring immunity for defense witnesses — effective defense and prosecutorial misconduct)
State v. Giraud, 258 Conn. 631 (Conn. 2001) (treats scope of Fifth Amendment privilege and immunity issues)
State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (allows substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements when declarant testifies and is cross-examined)
State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538 (Conn. 2012) (harmless‑error principles for nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings)
Furs v. Superior Court, 298 Conn. 404 (Conn. 2010) (§54-47a transactional and derivative use immunity explained)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause: prior testimonial statements of declarant who testifies at trial pose no Crawford constraint)
United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982) (example of reversal where primary defense witness’s refusal to answer deprived defendant of essential exculpatory testimony)
State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 (Conn. 2014) (standards for evaluating sentencing claims that a defendant was penalized for trial)