State v. Collins, 206 Conn.App. 438

Background

Middletown police conducted an investigation after multiple reports and two controlled buys (observed by officers) in August–October 2017; buys were made by a confidential informant (CI) and tested presumptively positive for crack.
A search warrant for Collins’ apartment, supported by an affidavit from Detectives Peck and Lathrop describing CI buys, prior reports, and record checks linking Collins to the apartment, was executed on Oct. 13, 2017.
Officers found 121 individually packaged crack bags, 14 glassine heroin bags, drug paraphernalia, $1,524 cash, and items tying the apartment to Collins; he was charged with two counts of possession with intent to sell.
At trial the state called Detective Peck as a fact witness and expert on narcotics trafficking; Peck answered hypotheticals that possession of 121 individually wrapped crack bags is consistent with selling.
Sergeant Yepes, on cross, testified he knew where Collins lived “from other situations,” prompting a defense mistrial motion alleging impermissible prior-misconduct inference; defense declined a curative instruction.
The trial court denied mistrial motions and denied Collins’ motion to suppress (finding probable cause for the warrant); Collins was convicted and appealed; the appellate court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Expert testimony on ultimate issue (intent to sell)	Peck’s hypothetical testimony about typical quantities and packaging is proper expert opinion and did not address Collins personally.	Peck’s testimony applying the 121-bag figure effectively opined that Collins intended to sell, invading the jury’s ultimate-fact role and prejudicing the defense.	Denied mistrial. Expert hypotheticals about quantities/packaging are admissible and, under State v. Nash, do not amount to an opinion on the ultimate issue.
Reference to prior misconduct (“other situations”) by Sgt. Yepes	The answer was a responsive, vague statement that did not specify prior crimes or investigations.	The phrase implied prior police involvement or misconduct contrary to an in limine ruling excluding prior bad acts, warranting a mistrial.	Denied mistrial. Statement was ambiguous (could mean victim/witness) and not an explicit reference to prior crimes; defense refused a curative instruction, and counsel cannot insist on mistrial in lieu of a curative instruction.
Probable cause for search warrant	Affidavit set out multiple reports, two controlled buys by a reliable CI observed by officers, surveillance linking Collins leaving and returning to the apartment after buys, and records linking Collins to the residence—supporting a fair probability contraband would be found.	Affidavit lacked particularity and a sufficient nexus tying the alleged sales to Collins’ apartment; it failed to establish CI veracity on the four corners.	Motion to suppress denied. Under the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and deference to the issuing judge, the affidavit provided a substantial factual basis and reasonable inferences to support probable cause.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620 (2006) (expert testimony on narcotics quantity/packaging is proper and does not necessarily state an opinion on the ultimate issue of intent)
State v. Berrios, 320 Conn. 265 (2016) (appellate standard of review for denial of mistrial; trial court discretion)
State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686 (2006) (mistrial is a drastic, disfavored remedy; curative measures preferred)
State v. Sawyer, 335 Conn. 29 (2020) (probable cause/warrant review principles and deference to issuing judge under totality of circumstances)
State v. Coltherst, 87 Conn. App. 93 (2005) (defense cannot demand mistrial in lieu of accepting a curative instruction)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (adopts totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause)