State v. Collier, 513 P.3d 477

Background

Jeffrey Collier was convicted of first-degree murder (off-grid) and aggravated robbery (on-grid) for crimes committed in 1993; after appeals and remands he was resentenced in 1998.
Resentencing produced a hard 15 life sentence with lifetime parole for murder and a consecutive 97-month prison term for aggravated robbery with no postrelease supervision specified.
Collier filed a second pro se motion (2020) arguing the aggravated robbery should have been designated the "primary crime," requiring 24 months of postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4720(b).
The State agreed the aggravated robbery sentence lacked the guideline postrelease supervision, but the district court denied Collier's motion as successive; the Supreme Court addressed the legality of the supervision term.
Central legal question: whether, under the 1993 statute, the sentencing court must impose the supervision period tied to the on-grid crime or instead is limited to the supervision associated with the off-grid crime.

Issues

Issue	Collier's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether aggravated robbery must carry 24 months postrelease supervision because it should be the "primary crime" for determining supervision	Collier: aggravated robbery was treated as the primary crime for supervision, so 24 months postrelease supervision should have been imposed	State: agreed that aggravated robbery lacked an express supervision term but argued the supervision period follows the primary crime as defined by the statute (and that primary may be the off-grid murder)	The court held the sentencing court may only impose the supervision associated with the off-grid crime; murder (off-grid) was the primary crime for supervision, producing lifetime parole; affirmed.
Whether K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4720(b)(2) prohibits using an off-grid crime to determine supervision	Collier: subsections disallow using an off-grid crime as the primary crime, so on-grid robbery should control supervision	State: the statute distinguishes primary crime for base-sentence calculation from the primary crime that determines supervision; Ross supports reading that "postrelease supervision" includes parole for off-grid crimes	Court held subsection (b)(2) bars using off-grid crimes to determine the base sentence only; it does not prevent using the off-grid crime to determine the supervision term.
Whether resentencing that imposed parole violated the mandate rule or constituted an ex post facto application of law	Collier: resentencing court exceeded the mandate and retroactively applied amended law to impose parole	State: resentencing corrected an ambiguity/illegality and applied the law in force at the time of the crimes	Court held resentencing was authorized to correct the supervision term; imposing lifetime parole under the 1993 statute was not ex post facto or barred by the mandate.
Whether the sentence was "illegal" and correctable under K.S.A. 22-3504	Collier: sentence is illegal for lacking required postrelease supervision for aggravated robbery	State: agreed the robbery sentence had no supervision term but contended supervision properly follows the off-grid crime	Court held sentence was legal as pronounced under 1993 statute; district court properly denied correction and sentence affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Collier, 259 Kan. 346 (1996) (prior appellate discussion of convictions)
State v. Collier, 263 Kan. 629 (1998) (remand and resentencing history)
State v. Collier, 306 Kan. 521 (2017) (prior § 22-3504 challenge to sentencing classification)
State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 1126 (2012) (held "postrelease supervision term" may include parole for off-grid crimes)
State v. Claiborne, 315 Kan. 399 (2022) (confirmed off-grid crimes are followed by life parole, not fixed postrelease supervision)
State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717 (2012) (rejected strict linear severity ranking across crimes)
State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587 (2007) (discussed use of primary crime for base-sentence calculation)
State v. Jackson, 314 Kan. 178 (2021) (standard of de novo review for summary denial of § 22-3504 motions)