State v. Coleman
121 N.E.3d 91
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Bennie Coleman was taken by Dayton detectives for a custodial interview about a July 2016 homicide; the recorded interview spanned multiple breaks and lasted from ~1:14 p.m. to 4:07 p.m.
- At ~2:37 p.m., after being accused of killing the victim, Coleman said, “Well, I plead the Fifth,” and then repeatedly indicated he had nothing more to say (head nods/shakes and verbal “I don’t”).
- Detective House did not immediately cease questioning, instead challenging Coleman (saying pleading the Fifth is for court, urging him to tell the truth, implying consequences) and asking clarifying questions that continued the interview.
- Detectives resumed interrogation after the exchange and later moved Coleman between rooms, provided refreshments, and continued questioning; additional statements were elicited after Coleman’s invocation.
- Coleman was indicted on weapon-under-disability and evidence-tampering charges and moved to suppress statements made after his invocation of the right to remain silent; the trial court granted suppression for post-invocation statements.
- The State appealed, arguing Coleman’s invocation was ambiguous and that Coleman later reinitiated the interview; the appellate court affirmed suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coleman’s statement “I plead the Fifth” was an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent | The statement was ambiguous and did not clearly communicate a desire to stop questioning | The phrase plus Coleman’s subsequent nods/shakes and verbal statements made an unambiguous invocation | Court: Invocation was unambiguous and unequivocal |
| Whether police scrupulously honored Coleman’s invocation | Even if invoked, Coleman later reinitiated the interview, so post-invocation statements are admissible | Police continued to question and pressured Coleman, failing to honor his invocation | Court: Police did not scrupulously honor the right; interrogation continued improperly |
| Whether Coleman’s later volunteered comments constituted a valid waiver or re-initiation | Coleman’s later words/behavior showed willingness to continue, constituting waiver | Any apparent re-initiation was prompted by the detectives’ improper questioning and misstatements, not a free waiver | Court: Any waiver was not voluntary—statements resulted from further interrogation and misstatements by police |
| Applicability of Bradshaw (suspect-initiated conversations after invocation) | Bradshaw supports admissibility where suspect initiates further discussion | Bradshaw is inapplicable because interrogation never stopped and police did not cease after invocation | Court: Bradshaw inapplicable; interrogation did not terminate so analysis differs |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and right to cut off questioning)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (post-waiver invocations must be unambiguous to require termination)
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975) (post-invocation admissibility depends on whether right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980) (definition of interrogation includes its functional equivalent)
- Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1987) (limits on interrogation; not every interaction is interrogation)
- Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (U.S. 1983) (analysis for suspect-initiated post-invocation statements when questioning had been terminated)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (right to counsel protections relevant to post-invocation questioning)