State v. Codiamat., 317 P.3d 664

Background

On Jan 24, 2011 the State charged Marianne L. Codiamat with harassment under HRS § 711‑1106(1)(a); the complaint alleged she "struck, shoved, kicked, or otherwise touched... in an offensive manner or subjected [the complainant] to offensive physical contact."
Codiamat moved to dismiss pretrial, arguing the complaint’s disjunctive use of "or" left her uncertain which act was charged and deprived her of due process; the district court granted dismissal without prejudice.
The ICA affirmed, relying on precedent (notably State v. Jendrusch and State v. Pesentheiner) that disallows disjunctive pleading where it joins non‑synonymous means, and found the two clauses described distinct conduct.
The State sought certiorari, arguing the charged alternatives were synonymous (all offensive touching) and that Hawai‘i precedent permitting limited disjunctive pleading should control or be overturned.
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held the complaint satisfied due process because the disjunctive alternatives were within a single statutory subsection, were reasonably related, and sufficiently apprised the defendant of the charged offense; it vacated the ICA judgment and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a complaint that uses disjunctive "or" for alternative means in one statutory subsection provides constitutionally sufficient notice	State: alternatives are synonymous (all describe offensive touching); disjunctive pleading here gave fair notice and defendant could prepare a defense	Codiamat: the listed acts/results are distinct; disjunctive pleading left her unsure which act was charged and deprived her of notice	Held: Complaint was sufficient; when alternatives lie within one subsection and are reasonably related, disjunctive wording can provide adequate notice
Whether Jendrusch’s rule forbids all disjunctive pleading of non‑synonymous acts	State: Jendrusch should be read narrowly or overturned; some disjunctive pleading is acceptable under practical, modern standards	Codiamat: Jendrusch and follow‑on precedent require conjunctive/and/or pleading when alternatives are non‑synonymous	Held: Court did not overrule Jendrusch broadly but interpreted it: disjunctive pleading is permissible where alternatives are within one subsection and reasonably related; no need to decide synonymy here
Proper interpretive balance between formal pleading rules and practical notice	State: adopt a reasonable, common‑sense standard (citing other jurisdictions) to avoid hypertechnical dismissals	Codiamat: protecting due process and fair notice requires rejecting disjunctive pleading that creates uncertainty; prefer conjunctive or and/or	Held: Adopted a practical rule—disjunctive language is allowed when it reasonably informs a person of common understanding and lets defendant prepare a defense, but not when it joins distinct subsections or truly disparate acts
Remedy for defective pleading using disjunctive language	State: dismissal was improper because notice was adequate	Codiamat: dismissal appropriate to protect due process	Held: Dismissal was improper here; ICA judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings

Key Cases Cited

State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 567 P.2d 1242 (1977) (articulated rule that when statute specifies several ways to violate it, charges may be conjunctive but not disjunctive)
State v. Pesentheiner, [citation="95 Hawai'i 290, 22 P.3d 86"] (App. 2001) (construed HRS § 711‑1106; distinguished direct offensive touching from offensive contact with an item appurtenant to the body)
State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 831 P.2d 924 (1992) (approving conjunctive or and/or pleading where an offense may be committed in more than one way)
State v. Lemalu, 72 Haw. 130, 809 P.2d 442 (1991) (discussed charging alternatives in separate counts or conjunctively)
State v. Sprattling, [citation="99 Hawai'i 312, 55 P.3d 276"] (2002) (pleading must inform a person of common understanding of the nature and cause of the accusation)