State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135

Background

Defendant Jaquez B. Clifton was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm relating to the July 20, 2014 killing of Frank Sanders; sentenced to life plus 25–30 years.
During voir dire the State used peremptory strikes on three of four African‑American venire members; defense raised a Batson challenge.
Clifton was custodially questioned for ~2½ hours; officers asked biographical questions before giving Miranda warnings, then elicited admissions (including he was present, held the door, heard a shot, and didn’t want Sanders to die). The court suppressed statements made after it found Clifton had invoked his right to cut off questioning.
Defense argued (1) Batson violation (racially motivated strikes), (2) Miranda/Seibert violation because warnings came mid‑interrogation and his “I can’t” amounted to invoking the right to silence, and (3) Brady violation/mistrial because a witness (Scott) disclosed at trial a post‑shooting statement by Clifton (“he did it”) that allegedly had not been previously disclosed.
Trial testimony included co‑defendant/co‑participant statements from Scott and Larry, eyewitness testimony, and forensic evidence (blood in vehicle; single gunshot fatal wound). The district court denied Batson and Brady claims and suppressed only post‑invocation statements; conviction affirmed on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Clifton)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Batson challenge to State’s peremptory strikes	Strikes targeted African‑American jurors; proffered reasons were pretextual	Prosecutor gave race‑neutral reasons (drug history, juvenile‑court sympathy, lack of forthcomingness); credibility of proffer entitled to deference	Court: reasons facially race neutral; no clear error in trial court’s finding of no purposeful discrimination — Batson denied
Miranda/Seibert — mid‑interrogation warnings and voluntariness of statements	Warnings came after interrogation began (question‑first); pre‑warning questioning tainted later statements under Seibert; also earlier “I can’t” was an invocation of right to silence so later statements should be suppressed	Pre‑Miranda questioning was limited, non‑incriminating biographical questioning; no pre‑Miranda confession to contaminate post‑Miranda statements; “I can’t” was ambiguous and not an unequivocal invocation	Court: Seibert not triggered (no substantive pre‑Miranda confession); “I can’t” was ambiguous and did not clearly invoke right to cut off questioning; only statements after unambiguous invocation were excluded, remainder admissible
Brady / motion for mistrial for late disclosure of witness’s prior omission	Late revelation that Scott told prosecutors the week of trial that Clifton said he “did it” deprived defense of impeachment and was favorable, material evidence suppressed under Brady	Prior inconsistent statements and prior police/deposition records (showing omission) were available to defense; the late disclosure was made at trial and cross‑examination was permitted; no material suppression occurred	Court: statement was inculpatory (not impeachment evidence of the type Brady protects here), and disclosure at trial cured prejudice; no Brady violation and no mistrial warranted

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prosecutor may not use peremptory strikes based solely on race)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation warnings and waiver rule)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (two‑step/question‑first interrogation may taint post‑warning confession)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (post‑warning confession can be admissible despite prior unwarned admission in some circumstances)
Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (Seibert not always applicable; context and continuity matter)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (invocation of right to remain silent must be unambiguous)
State v. DeJong, 287 Neb. 864 (Nebraska analysis on mid‑interrogation warnings and invocation clarity)