State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135

Background

Defendant Jaquez B. Clifton was convicted of first‑degree murder and use of a firearm after the shooting death of Frank Sanders on July 20, 2014; sentenced to life plus 25–30 years.
During custodial questioning, officers asked basic biographical questions for ~5 minutes before giving Miranda warnings; after warnings Clifton admitted being at the scene, said he held the door and heard a gunshot, and made other inculpatory statements. The court suppressed statements made after it found Clifton invoked his right to cut off questioning.
During voir dire the State used peremptory strikes on three African‑American venirepersons; defense raised a Batson challenge and the trial court denied relief after the State offered race‑neutral reasons.
At trial cooperating witnesses Scott and Larry implicated Clifton; Scott testified that Clifton later told him he “did it.” Defense argued the prosecution failed to disclose that conversation before trial and moved for mistrial under Brady.
The trial court denied suppression (except for statements after the court‑found invocation), denied Batson relief, and denied the mistrial motion; Clifton appealed those rulings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Clifton)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Validity of peremptory strikes under Batson	Strikes of three African‑American jurors were race‑based; reasons were pretextual	Prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons (drug history, juvenile‑court/therapist experience, non‑forthcoming demeanor) and court should defer to trial judge's credibility findings	Denied — State's reasons facially race‑neutral; no clear error in trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination
Admissibility of pre‑ and post‑Miranda statements (Seibert claim)	Entire interrogation tainted because warnings came after questioning (question‑first tactic)	Pre‑Miranda questions were minimal and non‑incriminating; post‑Miranda statements were not simply repeats of a prior confession	Denied — Seibert not implicated; pre‑Miranda period left much investigatory ground unsaid and produced no incriminating statements
Whether Clifton invoked right to cut off questioning earlier	“I can’t” and related expressions constituted an unambiguous invocation requiring cessation and suppression	Statements were ambiguous expressions of fear/incapacity; Clifton continued to answer and clarified, so a reasonable officer would not stop	Denied — Court found invocation was not unambiguous; answers that followed confirm not a clear invocation
Alleged Brady violation and motion for mistrial	Late disclosure that Scott told prosecutors the week of trial that Clifton had said he “did it” deprived defense of impeachment and fair trial	Defense had prior statements/deposition of Scott (which omitted this remark); the allegedly late info was presented at trial and cross‑examination was possible; continuance could be requested	Denied — statement was inculpatory (not favorable impeachment), prior omission was available for impeachment, and disclosure occurred at trial so no Brady violation or abuse of discretion in denying mistrial

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (Equal Protection prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation warnings and waiver rules)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (two‑step/question‑first interrogation can vitiate Miranda warnings)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (post‑warning confession may be admissible despite earlier inadvertent Miranda violation)
Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (post‑warning confession not invalidated where there was no prior incriminating admission to repeat)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (suspect must unambiguously invoke Miranda rights)
State v. DeJong, 287 Neb. 864 (Nebraska discussion of Miranda/Seibert analysis)
State v. Juranek, 287 Neb. 846 (Nebraska cases applying Elstad/Seibert principles)