State v. Clifton
892 N.W.2d 112
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Defendant Jaquez B. Clifton was convicted of first-degree murder and using a firearm in connection with the July 20, 2014 killing of Frank Sanders; sentence: life plus consecutive 25–30 years.
- During voir dire the State used peremptory strikes against three of four African‑American veniremembers (jurors Nos. 8, 13, 14); defense raised a Batson challenge which the district court denied.
- Clifton was interviewed in custody for about 2.5 hours; officers asked routine biographical questions before giving Miranda warnings; after warnings Clifton admitted being at the victim’s residence, holding a door, hearing a shot, and that he didn’t want the victim to die. The court suppressed some statements made after Clifton invoked the right to cut off questioning but denied broader suppression.
- Co‑defense witnesses (Absalom Scott, Rico Larry) testified implicating Clifton; Scott testified Clifton told him the day after the shooting that he “did it.” Defense moved for mistrial alleging a Brady violation for late disclosure of Scott’s post‑shooting statement to prosecutors.
- District court rejected Clifton’s Miranda/Seibert and Batson claims and denied the mistrial motion; Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Clifton’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Batson challenge to State’s peremptory strikes | Strikes of three African‑American veniremembers were pretextual and racially motivated | Prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons (juror drug history, juvenile‑court therapist sympathy, nonforthcoming demeanor); trial court credited those reasons | Affirmed — prosecutor’s reasons were facially race neutral and trial court did not clearly err in finding no purposeful discrimination |
| Suppression under Miranda / Missouri v. Seibert (question‑first tactic) | Entire statement should be suppressed because Miranda warnings were given after interrogation began (or warnings were ineffective) | Pre‑Miranda questioning was brief and non‑incriminating; no prior inculpatory statement was repeated post‑warning | Affirmed — Seibert not implicated; pre‑Miranda questions left much investigatory ground to cover and Clifton made no incriminating pre‑Miranda admissions |
| Invocation of right to remain silent (“I can’t”) | Clifton had unambiguously invoked his right to cut off questioning earlier, so subsequent statements should be suppressed | Statements were ambiguous, responsive to questioning, and pertained to refusing to ID cohorts rather than a blanket invocation | Affirmed — “I can’t” was ambiguous in context; a reasonable officer would not have understood it as an unequivocal invocation |
| Alleged Brady violation / motion for mistrial over late disclosure of Scott’s account that Clifton said he “did it” | Late disclosure deprived defense of impeachment/effective cross‑examination and warranted mistrial | Scott’s prior statements (omissions) were produced; the late information was revealed at trial and defense had opportunity to cross‑examine or request a continuance | Affirmed — no Brady violation (statement was inculpatory not exculpatory/impeaching in the Brady sense, prior inconsistent statements were disclosed, and trial disclosure cured any prejudice) |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race‑based peremptory challenges)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (two‑step question‑first Miranda tactic can taint post‑warning statements)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (post‑warning confession may be admissible despite earlier unwarned admission depending on circumstances)
- Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (post‑warning confession admissible where no earlier confession to repeat and circumstances break the continuum)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (a suspect must unambiguously invoke right to remain silent for questioning to cease)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (definition of interrogation for Miranda purposes)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (elements and materiality standard for Brady claims)