State v. Cleveland, 377 Mont. 97

On Oct. 25, 2012 Cleveland drove 99 mph in a 75 zone while intoxicated with his six‑month‑old child in the car; charged with felony criminal endangerment and three misdemeanors.
On Apr. 5, 2013 Cleveland signed a plea agreement pleading guilty to criminal endangerment, DUI, and habitual traffic offender; State agreed to dismiss one count and recommended a $500 fine and a three‑year deferred sentence conditioned on completion of Adult Impaired Driving Court.
A pre‑sentence report revealed an undisclosed prior felony that, under § 46‑18‑201(1)(b), MCA, generally precludes imposition of a deferred sentence.
At sentencing the State modified its recommendation to a three‑year suspended sentence (or alternatively allowed withdrawal of the plea); Cleveland argued he fit an exception allowing a deferred sentence and sought specific performance of the original plea.
The District Court concluded the § 46‑18‑222(5) exception did not apply to criminal endangerment and that the deferred‑sentence term of the plea was illegal due to the prior felony; it imposed a three‑year suspended sentence, $500 fine, and participation in treatment court.
Cleveland appealed; the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed, rejecting both the statutory‑exception argument and the claim for specific performance of the illegal plea term.

Issue	Cleveland's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether criminal endangerment qualifies under § 46‑18‑222(5) exception to prior‑felony bar to deferred sentence	Criminal endangerment involves risk of bodily injury and no injury occurred, so it fits the statute's exception	§ 46‑18‑222(5) requires an actual "threat" of bodily injury; criminal endangerment involves a "risk," not a "threat," so exception is inapplicable	Court held the statutes use different concepts; the exception does not cover criminal endangerment, so Cleveland was ineligible for a deferred sentence
Whether Cleveland was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement recommending a deferred sentence after discovery of prior felony	The State breached the plea; Cleveland should be allowed specific performance or to withdraw the plea (relying on plea‑bargain/contract precedents)	The deferred‑sentence term was illegal and unenforceable; the plea provision is void so specific performance is not available	Court held an illegal sentence term cannot be specifically enforced; plea provision was void and the State properly offered withdrawal or an alternative lawful sentence

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutorial promises that induce pleas must be fulfilled to preserve voluntariness)
State v. Munoz, 23 P.3d 922 (Mont. 2001) (remedies for state breach of a plea agreement may include withdrawal or specific performance)
State v. Rardon, 61 P.3d 132 (Mont. 2002) (discusses prosecutor obligations in plea bargaining and remedies for breach)
State v. Allen, 645 P.2d 380 (Mont. 1982) (prosecutors must meet strict standards in plea bargaining; plea agreements analyzed under contract principles)
State v. Deserly, 188 P.3d 1057 (Mont. 2008) (there can be no plea bargain to an illegal sentence; unauthorized sentence cannot be specifically enforced)