620 S.W.3d 400
Tex.2020Background
- Texas law limits voting by mail to five narrowly defined categories (e.g., voters 65+); statutes require a signed written application to request a mail ballot.
- Harris County Clerk Chris Hollins mailed applications to all registered voters aged 65+ (permitted) and announced plans to mass-mail unsolicited mail‑in‑ballot applications to all registered voters under 65 (most of whom are ineligible).
- The Texas Secretary of State demanded Hollins stop; Hollins refused, and the State sued Hollins in his official capacity asserting an ultra vires claim under the Election Code.
- The trial court denied the State’s request for a temporary injunction; the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the State had not shown irreparable harm.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review, held the Election Code does not authorize an early voting clerk to mass‑mail unsolicited mail‑in‑ballot applications, and remanded for a temporary injunction, concluding the State showed success on the merits and irreparable injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Election Code authorizes an early voting clerk to mass‑mail unsolicited mail‑in‑ballot applications | The State: No express or implied authority in the Code; mass mailing would be ultra vires | Hollins: Duty to "conduct early voting" and related provisions (forms availability) imply authority to distribute applications widely | Held: No implied authority; county officials have only express or indispensable implied powers, and mass mailing is not indispensable |
| Whether Sections requiring officials to make forms available and to mail on request imply power to send unsolicited applications | The State: Availability and on‑request mailing provisions assume applications are requested; silence on official unsolicited distribution implies prohibition | Hollins: Sections 1.010, 84.012, and 83.001 read together permit broad action to facilitate early voting | Held: Read in context, those provisions only support distribution on request; they do not authorize unsolicited mass mailings |
| Whether mass mailing would frustrate statutory uniformity and the Secretary of State’s role | The State: Mass mailing would undermine uniform application and the Secretary’s duty to maintain uniformity across counties | Hollins: (Implicit) emergency/public‑health circumstances and administrative discretion justify broader measures | Held: The Code emphasizes statewide uniformity and a deliberate limitation of mail voting; mass mailing would undercut that scheme |
| Whether the State established irreparable harm to obtain a temporary injunction | The State: Ultra vires conduct injures the sovereign; injunction standard satisfied by likely success on the merits because monetary damages are unavailable | Hollins: Ultra vires conduct does not automatically show irreparable harm; State must show particularized injury | Held: A showing of likely success on the merits in an ultra vires suit suffices because the sovereign cannot be made whole by damages and needs injunctive relief to enforce its laws |
Key Cases Cited
- In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2020) (context on Texas Legislature’s cautious approach to mail‑in voting)
- Foster v. City of Waco, 255 S.W. 1104 (Tex. 1923) (municipal entities only have express or indispensable implied powers)
- Tri‑City Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 2 v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1940) (implied powers limited to those indispensable to statutory grants)
- Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016) (counties possess only powers conferred by constitution or statute)
- Yett v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837 (Tex. 1926) (State’s interest in enforcement of laws against municipal officers)
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires suits as a vehicle for prospective injunctive relief by the State)