353 P.3d 979
Haw.2015Background
- Susan Chin was convicted after a jury trial on charges including first-degree theft and money laundering relating to her role as a caregiver for an elderly complainant. The jury returned mixed verdicts; Chin was convicted on Counts I, IV, and VI.
- After trial, defense witness Charles Bowen declared that a juror (the foreperson) approached him in a men’s room during trial and handed him a business card seeking employment; Bowen later realized the man was a juror and told Chin and her counsel.
- The defense moved for a new trial on the ground that the juror–witness contact violated Chin’s rights to an impartial jury and due process; the trial court denied the motion without questioning the juror(s).
- The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, applying a test that required the defendant to show she was substantially prejudiced before the court had a duty to investigate.
- The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the trial court erred by not investigating the alleged juror–witness contact and to clarify the proper application of the Williamson/Keliiholokai framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chin made a prima facie showing that the outside influence could substantially prejudice her right to a fair trial | The State: defendant failed to show substantial prejudice or that contact affected deliberations | Chin: juror (foreperson) violated court instruction and sought a favor from a defense witness; any nontrivial juror–witness contact raises a presumption of prejudice | Held: Chin made a prima facie showing—nontrivial contact between a juror and a witness is of a nature that could substantially prejudice the defendant |
| Duty of the trial court once a prima facie showing is made | The State: no duty to recall/question jurors absent evidence of actual prejudice | Chin: once presumption of prejudice is raised the court must investigate; burden shifts to State to prove harmlessness | Held: Trial court must investigate the totality of the circumstances (including questioning implicated juror(s)); State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; failure to investigate requires vacatur and remand for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Keliiholokai, 58 Haw. 356, 569 P.2d 891 (Haw. 1977) (trial court must determine whether outside influence’s nature could be substantially prejudicial and, if so, investigate)
- State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 807 P.2d 593 (Haw. 1991) (establishes prima facie showing raises rebuttable presumption and requires inquiry into totality of circumstances)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1954) (private communications with jurors during trial are presumptively prejudicial and warrant hearing)
- Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1892) (improper communications that could prejudice jurors can invalidate verdict)
- State v. Furutani, 76 Haw. 172, 873 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1994) (court not required to interrogate jury absent a showing that influence could substantially prejudice)
- State v. Bailey, [citation="126 Hawai'i 383, 271 P.3d 1142"] (Haw. 2012) (applied Williamson/Keliiholokai test; court properly investigated juror statements)
- State v. Amorin, 58 Haw. 623, 574 P.2d 895 (Haw. 1978) (trial court’s adequate investigation can show misconduct was harmless)
- State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 526 P.2d 94 (Haw. 1974) (strong policy protecting jury integrity; presumption of prejudice for unauthorized contacts)
