State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 662

May 1, 2006: Carlos Hernandez Perez was shot and killed. Police identified several Sureños 13 members, including Jose Miguel Chavarria-Cruz, as suspects.
At the first trial the State introduced Chavarria‑Cruz’s post‑arrest statement and accomplice testimony (F.S.); jury acquitted him of first‑degree premeditated murder but convicted him of second‑degree intentional murder for the benefit of a gang; district court sentenced him to 350 months.
This court reversed the conviction because the district court improperly admitted Chavarria‑Cruz’s statement after he sought counsel, and remanded for a new trial. State v. Chavarria‑Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2010).
On remand the State re‑indicted, adding first‑degree felony murder (murder during commission of aggravated robbery) plus second‑degree intentional murder (both gang‑enhanced). The district court denied Chavarria‑Cruz’s pretrial motion to dismiss the felony‑murder count on double jeopardy grounds.
At retrial the State presented largely the same evidence (without the suppressed statement), including accomplice testimony and corroborating non‑accomplice testimony (M.G.); jury convicted on both counts and district court again imposed a 350‑month sentence for second‑degree murder.
This appeal challenged (1) sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony for the second‑degree conviction, and (2) denial of the double jeopardy motion as to the felony‑murder charge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Chavarria‑Cruz)	Held
Sufficiency: whether accomplice F.S. was adequately corroborated to support conviction for second‑degree intentional murder (gang‑enhanced)	Corroboration came from non‑accomplice testimony (M.G.) and other evidence tying defendant to the scene and to shooting; credibility/plea deal are jury questions	F.S.’s testimony was unreliable and insufficiently corroborated	Affirmed: M.G.’s independent testimony sufficiently corroborated F.S.; viewed in most favorable light, evidence supports conviction
Pretrial double jeopardy challenge to indictment for first‑degree felony murder after prior acquittal of first‑degree premeditated murder	Proceeding on felony‑murder is permissible; any sentencing exposure was capped (350 months), so Double Jeopardy principles not violated	Retrial on felony‑murder reprosecutes an offense of which he was acquitted (first‑degree murder alternative means); Blockburger/Brown and state single‑behavior statutes bar the charge	Reversed denial of motion to dismiss: district court erred by focusing only on punishment. But no new trial required for the affirmed second‑degree conviction under Morris v. Mathews: defendant failed to show reasonable probability that the non‑barred conviction would not have occurred absent the jeopardy‑barred count; therefore conviction for second‑degree murder stands

Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970) (double jeopardy protects against the ordeal of retrial, not just increased punishment)
Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) (when a jeopardy‑barred conviction is reduced to a lesser non‑barred offense, defendant must show reasonable probability the lesser conviction depended on the barred conviction)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same‑elements test for double jeopardy in many contexts)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (successive prosecutions barred in some circumstances when second requires relitigation of factual issues resolved by first)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (definition of "reasonable probability" in prejudice contexts)
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy applies to the states via Fourteenth Amendment)
State v. Chavarria‑Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2010) (prior opinion reversing conviction due to improper admission of post‑custodial statement)