State v. Chase
964 N.W.2d 254
Neb.2021Background
- Amandah K. Chase was charged with two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault; complaint filed Oct 2, 2019; she was arrested Jan 21, 2020.
- Several pretrial/status hearings occurred in March–June 2020; the county court sua sponte continued trial dates (journals show continuances on March 26, May 28, June 11, and later dates).
- Chase moved for absolute discharge under the 6‑month speedy trial statute; without tolling the 6‑month period would have run July 21, 2020; motion filed July 27, 2020.
- At the discharge hearing the State introduced administrative orders and a clerk affidavit about COVID‑19 (juror impaneling and public‑health constraints); Chase did not object to those exhibits.
- The county court excluded 96 days under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f) as judicial delays for good cause (COVID‑19) and denied discharge; the district court affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Chase's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether periods of court sua sponte delay may be excluded under §29‑1207(4)(f) based on evidence presented later at a discharge hearing | Judicial delays can be excluded if the State proves good cause by a preponderance; evidence presented at the discharge hearing may establish that objective good cause existed at the time of the delay | Court must make contemporaneous, on‑the‑record findings of good cause when it issues a sua sponte continuance; later proof is untimely and impermissible | Held for State — contemporaneous articulation not required; later admissible evidence may show objective good cause that existed at the time of the delay |
| Whether the State met its burden to prove good cause for the specific continuances (COVID‑19) | Administrative orders and clerk affidavit established inability to impanel jurors and health/safety impediments, proving good cause by a preponderance | The State’s proof was untimely and could be a post‑hoc fabrication; insufficient to meet burden | Held for State — record evidence (orders, affidavit) adequately proved COVID‑19 conditions existed and furnished good cause |
| Whether statutory affidavit/hearing rules for party continuances (§25‑1148) apply to judicial sua sponte continuances | §25‑1148 governs party applications for continuance and does not constrain a court’s sua sponte scheduling/continuance practice | Vela‑Montes and §25‑1148 mean the State must have contemporaneous affidavit/support for any continuance relied on for exclusion | Held for State — §25‑1148 governs party requests and may be waived by lack of objection; it does not govern the court’s sua sponte orders |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980) (judicial delays may be excluded only if the court finds good cause)
- State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000) (judicial delay does not toll speedy trial rights absent State proof of good cause)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011) (later evidence supporting a continuance can be considered at a discharge hearing where it conforms to the original proffer and no substantial right was affected)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016) (good cause is a substantial reason affording a legal excuse)
- State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (2020) (speedy trial computation rules and applicability to complaints)
- State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021) (excludable periods under speedy trial statute and the arithmetic of the 6‑month clock)