State v. Chase
310 Neb. 160
Neb.2021Background
- Charges: Chase was charged with two counts of misdemeanor domestic violence assault; complaint filed Oct 2, 2019; arrested Jan 21, 2020; 6‑month speedy‑trial period thus ran to July 21, 2020.
- Pretrial scheduling: Multiple pretrial/status hearings occurred March–June 2020; the court sua sponte continued trial dates (journal entries show continuances to May, June, and August/September); defense expressed readiness for jury trial and at times responded "Okay" when the court announced continuances.
- Motion for discharge: Chase filed a motion for absolute discharge (speedy‑trial violation) on July 27, 2020; State bore burden to prove any excludable periods under § 29‑1207(4).
- Evidence at hearing: At the discharge hearing the State introduced administrative orders and a clerk affidavit showing COVID‑19 restrictions (e.g., inability to impanel jurors) and sought to exclude judicial delays as for "good cause."
- Trial courts’ rulings: County court found 96 days excludable under § 29‑1207(4)(f) due to the pandemic and denied discharge; the district court affirmed on appeal.
- Appellant’s claim: Chase argued the county court erred because (1) the court failed to articulate contemporaneous findings when it sua sponte continued trial dates and (2) the State’s proof of good cause presented later at the discharge hearing was untimely and cannot justify exclusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Chase) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial (sua sponte) continuances require contemporaneous specific findings of good cause, or whether good cause may be proven later at a discharge hearing | Good cause may be proved at the discharge hearing; only requirement is that the substantial reason objectively existed at the time of delay | Because the court made no contemporaneous findings when it sua sponte continued trial dates, the State may not later manufacture good cause; later evidence is untimely | Held: contemporaneous articulation is not required for judicial delays; good cause can be shown at the discharge hearing so long as it existed at the time of delay |
| Whether the statutory affidavit/timing requirements for party motions for continuance (§ 25‑1148) apply to judicial sua sponte continuances | § 25‑1148 governs party‑requested continuances, not sua sponte judicial delays | Vela‑Montes requires contemporaneous affidavit/support for continuances; that principle should bar late proof here | Held: § 25‑1148 does not govern sua sponte judicial continuances; Vela‑Montes is distinguishable |
| Whether the State met its burden to exclude time (i.e., proving good cause for delays) | Administrative orders and clerk affidavit re COVID‑19 showed that pandemic conditions objectively existed and provided good cause | Evidence was untimely or insufficient; defendant argued lack of contemporaneous findings undermined proof | Held: record supports that pandemic conditions existed at the time of the delays and provided good cause; county and district courts’ factual findings not clearly erroneous |
| Whether defendant waived speedy‑trial protection by failing to object or by acquiescing to continuances | A defendant who fails to move for absolute discharge or fails to timely object can waive the statutory 6‑month right | Chase contends she retained rights and timely moved for discharge | Held: failure to object can waive statutory protections, but court did not need to resolve waiver—affirmed on the ground that good cause was established |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835 (2021) (framework for computing speedy‑trial time and exclusions)
- State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (2021) (speedy‑trial computation principles)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378 (2011) (late presentation of evidence supporting a continuance may be harmless if no substantial variance from the original proffer)
- State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245 (2000) (judicial delay does not toll speedy‑trial period absent a showing of good cause)
- State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 (1980) (when relying on § 29‑1207(4)(f) to exclude judicial delay, the court must make specific findings as to good cause)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (definition of "good cause" as a substantial reason affording a legal excuse)