State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160

Background

Defendant Amandah K. Chase was charged with two misdemeanor third-degree domestic assault counts; complaint filed Oct. 2, 2019; arrested Jan. 21, 2020.
The 6‑month speedy‑trial period would have expired on July 21, 2020 absent tolling.
County‑court docket shows several status hearings and court‑ordered continuances (Mar. 26, May 28, June 11, 2020); some entries note continuances were “on motion of the Court.”
Chase filed a motion for absolute discharge (speedy‑trial violation) on July 27, 2020. At the discharge hearing the State introduced administrative orders and a clerk affidavit about COVID‑19 restrictions. Chase did not object to those exhibits.
The county court found 96 days excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f) because of the COVID‑19 pandemic and denied discharge; the district court affirmed on appeal.
Supreme Court affirmed, holding the State may establish good cause for judicial delays at the discharge hearing and that judicial sua sponte continuances are governed by § 29‑1207(4)(f) (good cause), not the affidavit rules in § 25‑1148 for party continuance requests.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Chase)	Held
Whether judicial sua sponte continuances must be supported by contemporaneous findings/evidence to exclude time under § 29‑1207(4)(f)	State: No; the State may prove good cause later at a discharge hearing so long as the reason objectively existed at the time of the delay	Chase: Yes; the court had to articulate its reasons contemporaneously and the State cannot "fabricate" good cause later	Held: Court may admit evidence at discharge hearing; only requirement is that the substantial reason objectively existed at time of delay; later proof is permissible
Whether the statutory affidavit/hearing requirements of § 25‑1148 apply to court‑ordered (sua sponte) continuances	State: § 25‑1148 governs party applications for continuances, not judicial sua sponte orders; thus its timing/form requirements do not apply	Chase: Vela‑Montes suggests timing matters and contemporaneous support is required; absence of contemporaneous reasons prejudiced defendant	Held: § 25‑1148 applies to parties’ continuance requests and can be waived; it does not govern judicial sua sponte continuances
Whether the State met its burden to exclude days for good cause (COVID‑19)	State: Exhibits (administrative orders, clerk affidavit) show pandemic conditions existed and provided good cause for the court delays	Chase: Presentation of that evidence only at the discharge hearing was untimely and insufficient; continuances lacked contemporaneous rationale	Held: State met burden; COVID‑19 conditions established good cause that existed at the time of the delays; exclusion affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980) (trial court must make specific findings when excluding judicial delays under the speedy‑trial statute)
State v. Vela‑Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011) (defendant's claim that lack of contemporaneous affidavit for a continuance was cured by later testimony; later evidence may remedy procedural defect absent material variance)
State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000) (judicial delay does not toll speedy‑trial period absent a showing of good cause)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016) (defines "good cause" as a substantial reason affording a legal excuse)
State v. Soltis, 11 Neb. App. 61, 644 N.W.2d 160 (2002) (on review, courts may consider the whole record when evaluating good cause after a discharge hearing)
State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (2020) (procedures for computing speedy‑trial time and excludable periods)