State v. Charles, 304 Kan. 158

Background

On Dec. 25, 2009, Leonard D. Charles, Sr. drove his SUV into a Family Video lot, followed and collided with Autumn McDowell’s car in a residential pursuit — McDowell suffered whiplash and ~$4,000 in damage.
Inside the store after the collision, Charles made threats to kill if he could not reach his dying mother; he damaged store property; an employee called 911 and he was arrested.
Charged with intentional aggravated battery (alleging the SUV as a deadly weapon), criminal damage to property, and criminal threat; jury convicted on lesser-included reckless aggravated battery, criminal damage, and criminal threat.
Sentenced to 34 months’ imprisonment; the district court required KORA violent-offender registration based on judicial finding of deadly-weapon use.
On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court Charles raised six issues (instructional overbreadth, alternative means/sufficiency, limiting instruction for prior statements, prosecutorial misconduct for saying “I think,” cumulative error, and KORA registration constitutional challenge). The Court affirmed convictions but vacated the registration requirement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Breadth of lesser-included instruction	State argued reckless aggravated battery instruction was appropriate as a lesser-included offense	Charles argued the instruction was overbroad because it allowed conviction for uncharged actus reus (“in any manner whereby great bodily harm…”) beyond the complaint’s SUV-as-deadly-weapon theory	Instruction was legally and factually inappropriate (overbroad) but error was not "clear" under plain-error standard; conviction stands
Alternative means / sufficiency of evidence	State maintained statute does not create alternative-means crime and evidence supports deadly-weapon or dangerous-manner theory	Charles argued aggravated battery is alternative-means crime and State failed to prove either means beyond reasonable doubt	Court held statute is not alternative-means; viewed evidence in State’s favor and found sufficient proof to support reckless aggravated battery conviction
Prosecutorial misconduct (closing argument: "I think")	State contended phrases were rhetorical verbal tics and permitted as inference-based argument	Charles argued repeated personal-opinion statements improperly vouched and prejudiced jury	Court found many "I think" usages were mere tics in context and not outside permitted latitude; cautioned prosecutors to avoid such phrasing; no reversible misconduct found
KORA registration / Apprendi challenge	State argued KORA registration requirement was not punishment for Apprendi/Sixth Amendment purposes	Charles argued KORA’s public dissemination, reporting fee, and felony penalty render it punitive so judicial factfinding (not jury) violates Apprendi	Court held KORA registration (2009 version) is punitive for Due Process purposes; Apprendi requires jury factfinding on deadly-weapon finding — vacated registration requirement

Key Cases Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment jury-trial requirement for facts increasing punishment)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimum must be found by jury)
Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291 (Kan. 2016) (KORA amendments held punitive as applied to sex offenders; factors for punitive-effect analysis)
State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494 (Kan. 2013) (overbroad instruction analysis; notice and prejudice considerations)
State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793 (Kan. 2009) (example of reversal where overbroad instruction expanded prosecution theory)
State v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527 (Kan. 2007) (instructional overbreadth can prejudice when State proceeds only on one theory)
State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828 (Kan. 2013) (statutory interpretation holding that aggravated battery provision is not an alternative-means crime)
State v. Whittington, 260 Kan. 873 (Kan. 1996) (automobile can constitute a deadly weapon)