State v. Chandler
307 Kan. 657
| Kan. | 2018Background
- On July 7, 2002, Mike Sisco and Karen Harkness were found shot to death in Karen's Topeka home; no gun or fingerprints linked anyone to the scene.
- Dana Chandler (Mike's ex-wife), living in Colorado at the time, became a suspect; she was arrested in 2011 and tried in 2012 on two counts of premeditated first-degree murder.
- The State's circumstantial case relied on: Chandler's inconsistent alibi statements and gas purchases; evidence of obsessive behavior toward the victims; and two incriminating jailhouse phone calls.
- The jury convicted Chandler and the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences with mandatory 50-year terms; Chandler appealed raising sufficiency, prosecutorial error, evidentiary, and cumulative-error claims.
- The State conceded sentencing (hard-50) error under Alleyne; the Supreme Court found multiple prosecutorial errors—one conceded by the State (false statement that a judicial protection-from-abuse order existed)—and reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Chandler) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence to support first-degree premeditated murder convictions | Circumstantial evidence (motive, opportunity, gas purchases, phone records, jail calls) sufficed to convict | Evidence was wholly circumstantial, speculative, and did not place Chandler at scene; convictions rest on inference-stacking | Viewing evidence in light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could convict; sufficiency challenged but not barred by double jeopardy because evidence was sufficient |
| Prosecutorial error: false claim that victim obtained a protection-from-abuse (PFA) order against Chandler | Misstatement was inadvertent or confusion with routine temporary divorce orders; not outcome-determinative | Statement was a deliberate or reckless misrepresentation that impermissibly suggested judicial validation and prior bad acts | The prosecutor argued facts not in evidence; the State conceded the error; under Chapman prejudice test the error was not harmless—reversal required |
| Other alleged prosecutorial errors (opening/closing misstatements re: route to Nebraska, internet searches, intelligence, gallery references, sympathy appeals) | Many statements were permissible rhetorical inference or misunderstanding; jury instructions cure any minor misstatements | Statements misstated or exceeded the evidence and improperly appealed to emotion or suggested matters outside the record | Multiple remarks were outside the prosecutor’s wide latitude; several constituted error (some rising to prosecutorial misconduct); court reversed on primary PFA error and noted others to avoid repetition |
| Use of post-arrest silence and comment on Miranda implications | Silence evidence was pre-Miranda or otherwise admissible; not relied on as primary proof | Prosecutor improperly used post-arrest silence as evidence of guilt without establishing Miranda timing or foundation | Court found the record insufficient to justify using silence as evidence; comment was at best cavalier and raised constitutional concern though resolution on that specific Doyle question was not necessary to reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional harmless-error standard governing prejudice analysis)
- Sherman v. State, 305 Kan. 88 (2016) (adopts two-step prosecutorial error framework and Chapman harmlessness inquiry)
- Jefferson v. State, 297 Kan. 1151 (2013) (appellate review of sufficiency must consider all evidence admitted at trial, even if later found erroneous)
- Lloyd v. State, 299 Kan. 620 (2014) (standard of review for sufficiency—view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
- Flynn v. State, 274 Kan. 473 (2002) (circumstantial evidence can support first-degree murder conviction)
- Pabst v. State, 268 Kan. 501 (2000) (prosecutor statements outside the record can require reversal when they affect jury decision)
- Akins v. State, 298 Kan. 592 (2014) (prosecutorial bolstering and false judicial-approval claims can require reversal)
- Foster v. Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845 (2006) (argument that a judge previously endorsed the State's theory can improperly influence a jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (fact-finding that increases mandatory minimum must be found by jury; used here to concede sentencing error)