State v. Champada
2016 Ohio 7291
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Nov. 10, 2013, Fulton County deputies investigated a residential burglary in Delta; a gun cabinet containing five firearms and other items were taken along with a TV and other goods.
- Appellant Pacio Champada was linked through witness testimony (co-defendant Jacob Baker and appellant’s girlfriend Danielle Figy) and evidence of the sale/disposal of stolen firearms.
- Champada was indicted on burglary (R.C. 2911.12(A)(3)), grand theft (R.C. 2913.02), theft, and having weapons while under disability; a jury convicted him on all counts.
- At sentencing the trial court imposed consecutive prison terms totaling 47 months (11 months for theft; 12 months for each remaining count).
- On appeal Champada argued (1) the court committed plain error by imposing multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import (burglary, theft, grand theft), and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the multiple sentences.
- The Sixth District affirmed, holding burglary was committed separately from the thefts and the theft of firearms involved separate harm/animus from theft of other items, so convictions and consecutive sentences were proper; counsel was not ineffective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court committed plain error by imposing multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import (burglary, theft, grand theft) | Champada: burglary, theft, and grand theft are allied offenses and should merge; sentencing on multiple counts was plain error | State: offenses were not allied — burglary occurred, suspects fled, then returned (separate acts); theft of firearms created distinct harm/animus from theft of other items | Court: No plain error. Burglary was a separate act; theft of firearms and theft of other items involved separate harm/animus — separate convictions/sentences allowed |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to multiple sentences for allied offenses | Champada: counsel should have objected to allied-offense sentencing, and failure prejudiced him | State: counsel’s failure to object was not outside professionally competent assistance because offenses were not allied; no reasonable probability of different outcome | Court: Counsel not ineffective under Strickland — strategic decision was reasonable given that offenses were not allied |
Key Cases Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967) (procedural standard for counsel’s motion to withdraw on appeal)
- State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 (Ohio 2010) (plain-error review where allied-offense agreement accepted by court)
- State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 (Ohio 2010) (two-part test for allied offenses: possibility to commit both by same conduct, and whether committed by same conduct/state of mind)
- State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 (Ohio 2015) (three-question approach: dissimilar import, separate commission, separate animus)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
