State v. Cesar Gabriel Castrejon, 44783

Defendant Cesar Gabriel Castrejon was charged by information with two counts alleged under Idaho Code §§ 18-903(b) and 18-915(3) for battery on law enforcement officers: Count I for striking an officer in the face, Count II for kicking a deputy in the knee.
Castrejon pleaded not guilty at arraignment, later agreed to enter an Alford plea to Count I with Count II to be dismissed.
At the change-of-plea hearing the district court sua sponte questioned whether the information charged felonies or misdemeanors, focusing on the phrase "touching and/or striking."
The district court concluded that "striking" fell within the misdemeanor exception in I.C. § 18-915(3) and remanded the matter to magistrate court for lack of jurisdiction.
The State appealed, arguing the information charged felonies because I.C. § 18-915(3) excepts only "unlawful touching," not "striking."
The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute’s plain language excepts only "unlawful touching," so charging "striking" in the information alleged felonies and the district court erred in remanding.

Issue	State's Argument	Castrejon's Argument	Held
Preservation	State consistently argued below that the information charged felonies because it alleged "striking," preserved for appeal	State did not raise plain-language argument below, so issue is unpreserved	Preserved — State raised the issue at the change-of-plea hearing and the record shows the same contention on appeal
Invited error	State did not induce the court’s remand; prosecutor’s brief agreement was ambiguous and did not cause the error	Prosecutor’s agreement with the court’s reading invited/acquiesced to the error, barring appeal	Not invited — prosecutor did not cause or play an important role in prompting the remand
Statutory construction of I.C. § 18-915(3)	"Except unlawful touching" only excludes touching; striking remains punishable as a felony	Phrase "unlawful touching" (as used in § 18-903(b)) includes "touching or striking," so striking is excluded from felony provision	Court applied plain-meaning: statute unambiguous; only "unlawful touching" is excepted, not "striking"
Did the information charge felonies?	Information alleges defendant "touch and/or strike" and specifically alleges striking — thus charged felonies under § 18-915(3)	Because § 18-903(b) defines battery as "touching or striking," both are misdemeanors and magistrate had jurisdiction	Information charged felony counts for striking; district court’s remand reversed

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (appellate review limited to issues raised below)
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192 (issues not raised below generally not considered on appeal)
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (doctrine of invited error bars complaint when party induced the error)
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237 (clarifies when a party’s assent does not constitute invited error)
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654 (plain and unambiguous statutory language must be given its ordinary meaning)
In re Adoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554 (courts may not insert terms into statutes that are not present)