State v. Cepec (Slip Opinion), 149 Ohio St. 3d 438

Background

Defendant Steven E. Cepec, on parole and assigned to a halfway house, fled the program and, on June 3, 2010, entered Frank Munz’s home; Munz was found with multiple skull fractures and strangulation injuries and later died. Cepec was arrested nearby with Munz’s blood on clothing and weapons; keys to Munz’s vehicles/house were recovered from the police cruiser.
Cepec made multiple statements to police: initially denying involvement and blaming Paul Munz, later confessing (after repeated Miranda warnings) that he participated in the robbery and killed Munz; he implicated girlfriend Michelle Palmer in planning and partial participation.
Jury convicted Cepec of aggravated murder (merged to a single count of aggravated murder while committing aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and related specifications; jury unanimously recommended death and the trial court imposed death plus consecutive prison terms.
On appeal Cepec challenged (inter alia) admissibility of pretrial statements (claiming invocation of counsel), trial-court questioning and alleged judicial bias, ineffective assistance of counsel (voir dire, mitigation presentation), prosecutorial misconduct in closing, and constitutional challenges to Ohio’s death-penalty scheme.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed convictions and sentence after addressing suppression, ineffective-assistance, judicial-intervention, prosecutorial-argument, and mitigation-weight issues and conducting the R.C. 2929.05 independent review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of June 3 statements after defendant asked for a lawyer regarding a Luminol test	Cepec: his question asking for a lawyer before the Luminol test was an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel that required cessation of questioning and suppression of subsequent statements	State: the request was limited to a specific circumstance (Luminol test); it was not an unequivocal request for counsel for all questioning and no Luminol test was used; furthermore Cepec later reinitiated communication and confessed after Miranda warnings	Court: request was limited and not an unequivocal invocation for all purposes; even if error, admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; claim rejected
Ineffective assistance for voir dire (questioning about Aryan Brotherhood)	Cepec: counsel’s question about Aryan Brotherhood ‘‘poisoned’’ Juror 213 and was deficient	State: counsel reasonably explored a potential juror reaction because tattoo evidence might be visible; voir dire choices are strategic and entitled to deference	Court: counsel’s questioning not deficient and, in any event, no showing Juror 213 was actually biased; claim rejected
Judicial interjections and alleged bias / request for mistrial	Cepec: judge’s frequent, interruptive questioning and some clarifying questions elicited prejudicial testimony and demonstrated bias requiring mistrial or reversal	State: judge’s questions were within Evid.R. 614(B) to clarify testimony; judge interrupted both sides and gave curative instruction when needed; no evidence of pervasive bias	Court: no structural bias shown; questions were largely impartial clarifications; curative instructions and the record prevent a finding of reversible error; mistrial denied
Prosecutorial remarks in penalty-phase closings about "force" and describing crime	Cepec: prosecutor improperly invited the jury to consider the nature/circumstances of the murder as an aggravating circumstance (impermissible); prejudiced the death recommendation	State: prosecutor properly described facts and force to prove statutory aggravators and to explain why aggravators outweigh mitigation; jury instructed not to treat the murder itself as an aggravator	Court: remarks did not plainly err; describing force and facts to support statutory aggravators was permissible and jury instructions cured any potential confusion

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and counsel entitlement rule)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (invocation-of-counsel standard: suspect must unambiguously request counsel)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test of deficient performance and prejudice)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (peremptory strikes may not be used discriminatorily by race)
State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516 (Ohio 2001) (waiver and implied waiver of Miranda rights analyzed in context)
State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344 (Ohio 1996) (limits on prosecutorial argument in penalty phase regarding what constitutes an aggravating circumstance)
State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597 (Ohio 1992) (forfeiture of reviewable error by failing to object at trial; plain-error standard)
State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460 (Ohio 2000) (mitigation evidence and counsel’s strategic choices in presenting mitigation)