State v. Cazares-Mendez/Reyes-Sanchez
256 P.3d 104
Or.2011Background
- Jessie Valero was found dead from about 29 stab wounds in Hillsboro; Valero owned no red bicycle found at scene and jewelry box contents were removed.
- A third defendant, Lugardo-Madero, testified that he and both defendants attempted to obtain methamphetamine and then went to Valero's apartment to break in for jewelry; Lugardo-Madero left when noises were heard.
- Cazares-Mendez arrived at the apartment later, washed clothes, bathed, then Reyes-Sanchez arrived; all three left separately; Lugardo-Madero later heard Cazares-Mendez admit the murder.
- Both defendants were indicted on multiple counts, including two counts of aggravated murder; trial of Reyes-Sanchez occurred first, then Cazares-Mendez.
- During both trials, defendants sought to introduce hearsay statements by Tiffany Scherer, who allegedly confessed to the murder to four witnesses; the statements were offered under OEC 804(3)(c) and OEC 803(28)(a).
- Trial courts excluded the hearsay, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review and remanded for new trials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the corroboration requirement of OEC 804(3)(c) is satisfied by Scherer’s statements. | Cazares-Mendez: corroboration clearly indicates trustworthiness. | Cazares-Mendez: corroboration not properly considered; due process concerns arise if unavailable declarant is used. | Corroboration supports trustworthiness; trial court erred in not considering all factors. |
| Whether due process requires admission of Scherer’s statements when the declarant is available to testify outside the penal-interest exception. | State argues no due process requirement to admit because unavailable rule applies. | Chambers-based due process requires admission when statements are trustworthy and central to defense. | Due process requires admission; unavailability rule cannot bar trustworthy evidence when declarant is available. |
| Whether the residual hearsay exception OEC 803(28)(a) supports admission here. | State argues residual exception should apply because of trustworthiness and probative value. | Residual exception was intended narrowly and does not apply where penal-interest exception exists. | Residual exception does not apply when a specific penal-interest exception is available and applicable. |
| Whether the trial court properly evaluated trustworthiness of the declarant's statements under OEC 804(3)(c) and 803(28)(a). | Court should treat credibility of witnesses as irrelevant to declarant’s trustworthiness. | Court should consider witness credibility to assess trustworthiness of statements. | Trustworthiness focuses on the declarant’s statements; witness credibility is not a proper consideration for admissibility. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1973) (due process requires admission of trustworthy out-of-court statements when essential to defense)
- Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2006) (reaffirmed Chambers; evidentiary rules cannot block trustworthy hearsay that bears on defense)
- Campbell, 299 Or. 633 (Or. 1985) (residual hearsay exception limited; cannot rescue otherwise inadmissible hearsay within penal-interest category)
- Chambers (Chambers) discussed in Oregon cases, 299 Or. 661 (Or. 1985) (dissenting/related discussion on residual hearsay limits)
- Wright v. Swann, 261 Or. 440 (Or. 1972) (witness credibility and risk of fabrication; not a basis to exclude hearsay testimony)
- Sheedy v. Stall, 255 Or. 594 (Or. 1970) (declarant’s statement trustworthiness governs admissibility, not witness credibility)
- State v. Cook, 340 Or. 530 (Or. 2006) (trustworthiness and admissibility standards under Oregon Evidence Code)
- State v. Mendez, 308 Or. 9 (Or. 1989) (pre-OEC standard on hearsay reliability)
- State v. Barrett, 350 Or. 390 (Or. 2011) (contextual backdrop for admissibility and due process discussion in Oregon)