State v. Caulk, 1705002474 & 1705004722

Robert P. Caulk was convicted after a two‑day bench trial of three counts of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony for separate convenience‑store robberies in April–May 2017.
The State successfully sought Habitual Criminal treatment; on July 16, 2018 the court imposed two mandatory 25‑year Level V terms, one 15‑year term (with three years unsuspended), and a two‑year Level V term, producing an unsuspended 55‑year Level V span made up of statutory minimums.
At sentencing (effective July 20, 2017) applicable law prohibited making those robbery terms run concurrently with other sentences; none of the mandatory minimums could be suspended or made concurrent.
Caulk’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. More than a year after sentencing he filed a Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) motion asking the court to apply the 2019 Amended Sentencing Act ("House Bill 5") retroactively so his separate mandatory terms would run concurrently.
The court denied relief: it treated the Rule 35(b) filing as untimely, held that Rule 35 is not a vehicle to revisit a sentence because of subsequent statutory changes, and concluded the 2019 amendments do not authorize retroactive modification of Caulk’s preexisting sentence.

Issue	State's Argument	Caulk's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 35(b) jurisdiction exists for a motion filed >90 days after sentencing	Rule 35 requires prompt filing (within 90 days); court loses jurisdiction absent "extraordinary circumstances"	HB5 or its effects constitute a basis for relief under Rule 35	Motion untimely; no extraordinary circumstances shown; court lacks Rule 35 jurisdiction to act
Whether Rule 35 may be used to reexamine a sentence in light of a subsequent statutory change (House Bill 5)	Rule 35 has never been an instrument to reexamine sentences because of subsequent statutory amendments	HB5 grants courts absolute discretion to impose concurrent sentences and thus should apply to Caulk’s case	Rule 35 cannot be used to apply subsequent statutory changes; such changes are not "extraordinary circumstances" under Rule 35
Whether the 2019 Amended Sentencing Act may be applied retroactively to make previously imposed mandatory terms run concurrently	The General Assembly did not provide for retroactive application or special procedures; statutory scheme and prior law prohibited concurrency for these offenses	HB5’s expanded sentencing discretion permits retroactive deeming of sentences as concurrent, effectively reducing the imposed term	HB5 is not retroactive as applied here; court cannot modify its original judgment to make the mandatory terms run concurrently

State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019) (subsequent statutory changes do not furnish Rule 35 relief or automatic retroactive application)
State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015) (Rule 35(b) requires prompt filing; court loses jurisdiction after 90 days absent extraordinary circumstances)