State v. Cates, 12 A.3d 116

A Montgomery County Automated Enforcement Program (AEP) captures police speeding, with TA 21-809 prescribing procedures and the District Court ex parte steps to identify the driver when ownership lies with an entity like a police department.
When officers Cates, Kucsan, Tran, and Way were recorded speeding in on-duty police vehicles, the AEP issued citations to the Department as owner; CAD and internal checks showed no emergency at the time.
The Department conducted its own internal investigation, found no emergency justification, and reissued the citations in the officers’ names.
The District Court found the officers guilty; the Circuit Court reversed, holding the Department’s internal investigation policy violated due process.
The State sought certiorari; this Court granted to decide (1) whether liability may be transferred to an on-duty officer for a speed violation, and (2) whether due process was satisfied before transfer.
The Court held officers are liable for speeding even on-duty, and that the Department’s informal investigation did not violate due process because adequate notice, a later District Court proceeding, and judicial review provided sufficient protections.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a political subdivision may transfer liability to an officer for a speed-cameras citation when the officer is on duty and not responding to an emergency.	Officers: statutory procedure TA 21-809 governs reissuance; department deviation violated statute.	County: officers are subject to rules of the road; speeding may be justified under limited circumstances; procedures complied with overall.	Yes; officers liable despite on-duty status under the applicable statute and rules.
Whether the Department’s unwritten internal investigation policy deprived the Officers of due process.	Delay and lack of written standards hinder recall of justification; unwritten policy creates arbitrariness.	Due process satisfied; officers had notice and later opportunity for District Court trial and de novo appeal; Mathews balancing supports adequacy.	No due process violation; procedures, including later court review, provide adequate protections.

Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 249 Md. 334 (1968) (backstop of judicial review can satisfy due process when hearings are available later)
Howlin Realty Mgmt. v. Calvert County Planning Commission, 364 Md. 301 (2001) (due process focused on fundamental fairness, not mere statutory compliance; flexibility under Howlin)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test for due process)
Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374 (2006) (procedural due process requires notice and hearing appropriate to the case; Mathews framework applied)
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice and opportunity to be heard as due process baseline)
Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (due process scope limited to interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment)