State v. Castro
2017 NMSC 27
| N.M. | 2017Background
- Jesus M. Castro was charged with two counts of criminal sexual penetration (digital and penile). He was arrested Feb 2009, arraigned June 15, 2009, and remained at liberty on bond throughout proceedings.
- The first jury trial occurred April 7, 2010 (about 11 months after arraignment) and ended in a mistrial (hung jury). A retrial was held Dec 5, 2012 — a 32‑month delay between trials.
- Castro did not assert a speedy‑trial demand before conviction; his trial counsel (Jonathan Huerta) also did not demand a speedy trial. After conviction, new counsel moved to dismiss on speedy‑trial grounds, alleging ineffective assistance for Huerta’s failure to demand a speedy trial.
- The district court denied the speedy‑trial dismissal. The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance and, if found, to reassess the speedy‑trial claim.
- The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that (1) on this record Castro’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated under Barker, and (2) Castro did not make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance to justify remand for an evidentiary hearing; it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Castro) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Castro’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial violated by the 32‑month delay between mistrial and retrial? | State: Delay partly due to neutral/justified causes (witness unavailability, discovery, some defendant‑attributable continuances); prejudice not shown. | Castro: 32‑month delay was presumptively prejudicial; counsel’s failure to demand speedy trial should be imputed to the State or excused due to counsel neglect. | No. Court applied Barker factors: length weighed against State, reasons weighed only slightly against State, Castro failed to assert right, and no undue prejudice — overall no speedy‑trial violation. |
| Should attorney neglect (failure to demand speedy trial) be considered in the Barker analysis and warrant remand for an evidentiary hearing? | State: Stock/Serros reasoning (imputing attorney neglect) applies only in extreme cases of extraordinary delay and custodial prejudice; not applicable here. | Castro: Huerta’s failure to assert the right constituted ineffective assistance and could change the speedy‑trial analysis. | No. Court distinguishes Stock and Serros (extreme custodial prejudice). Here defendant was not incarcerated and did not show comparable prejudice; court declined to conflate analyses and rejected mandatory remand. |
| Did Castro make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland) to justify a remand/evidentiary hearing? | State: The record contains only defendant’s affidavit; counsel’s conduct can be explained by plausible strategy (e.g., tactical delay, immigration concerns). | Castro: Lack of counsel action on speedy‑trial right amounted to deficient performance causing prejudice. | No. Court held that a prima facie case was not shown because counsel’s omission could plausibly be strategic; proper remedy is habeas corpus if defendant wishes to develop record. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes four‑factor speedy trial balancing test)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 (N.M. 2016) (considered attorney neglect in Barker analysis where delay and custodial prejudice were extreme)
- State v. Stock, 147 P.3d 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (attributed delays to attorney neglect in egregious factual context)
- State v. Garza, 212 P.3d 387 (N.M. 2009) (benchmarks for simple‑case speedy‑trial analysis)