State v. Castro, 36,062

Jesus M. Castro was arrested Feb. 6, 2009 and indicted for two counts of criminal sexual penetration; he posted bond and remained at liberty.
First jury trial occurred ~11 months after arraignment (within the one-year benchmark for a simple case) and resulted in a mistrial.
Thirty-two months elapsed between the mistrial (Apr. 7, 2010) and retrial (Dec. 5, 2012); at retrial Castro was convicted on one count and acquitted on the other.
Castro and his trial counsel (Jonathan Huerta) never demanded a speedy trial before conviction; a new attorney filed a post-trial motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, alleging ineffective assistance for failure to assert the right.
The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance; the State sought certiorari to ask whether mere failure to file a speedy-trial demand establishes a prima facie Strickland claim.
The Supreme Court considered (1) whether Castro’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was violated under Barker and (2) whether Castro made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to demand a speedy trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Castro)	Held
Whether Castro’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the 32‑month delay between mistrial and retrial	Delay was substantial but much of it was justified or attributable to neutral reasons; other Barker factors (defendant’s failure to assert the right, minimal prejudice) weigh against finding a violation	The 32‑month delay after the mistrial was presumptively prejudicial and, when balanced with the State’s reasons, violated his speedy‑trial right	No speedy‑trial violation: length was presumptively prejudicial, but reasons for delay only slightly weigh against the State, Castro failed to assert the right, and he did not show undue prejudice; overall Barker balance favors the State
Whether failure of trial counsel to demand a speedy trial establishes a prima facie Strickland claim and warrants an evidentiary hearing	The Court of Appeals found Castro made a prima facie showing and remanded for a hearing to test ineffective assistance claims	Castro argued counsel’s omission was deficient and prejudicial; alleged he didn’t assert right earlier because of counsel’s ineffective assistance	No prima facie Strickland showing on the record: counsel’s omission could be explained by plausible strategy (e.g., tactical delay to benefit defense or avoid immigration consequences); remand for evidentiary hearing was improper — habeas is the appropriate vehicle for developing the record

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (speedy-trial balancing test)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two‑prong test)
State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 (N.M. 2016) (considering attorney neglect in extreme delay/incarceration contexts)
State v. Stock, 147 P.3d 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (attorney neglect factored into speedy‑trial analysis in egregious circumstances)
State v. Garza, 212 P.3d 387 (N.M. 2009) (one‑year benchmark for simple cases; weighing Barker factors)
State v. Samora, 387 P.3d 230 (N.M. 2016) (discussing threshold presumptive prejudice and Barker balancing)
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004) (prima facie standard for ineffective-assistance claims)