State v. Castorena, 486 S.W.3d 630

In 2008 a grand jury indicted Raul Becerra Castoreña for theft and misapplication of fiduciary property; the indictment was later amended to add aggregation language alleging amounts obtained pursuant to one scheme with an aggregate value between $1,500 and $20,000.
At the first trial, the court granted a directed verdict on the theft count; the jury deadlocked on misapplication and the court declared a mistrial.
Before retrial, Castoreña filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing it failed to give reasonable notice because it alleged misapplications over a multi-year period without specifying the individual instances.
The trial court granted the motion to quash; the State appealed under the statute permitting appeals of orders dismissing indictments.
The State argued (1) the indictment provided sufficient notice because it charged an aggregated offense under the Penal Code aggregation provision, and (2) Castoreña waived any form/substance complaints by not objecting before the first trial.
The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding aggregation language and the State's filing of business-records (434 pages of cell records) supplied constitutionally sufficient notice and that Article 21.15 did not require further specifics because intentional/knowing culpability was also alleged.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Castoreña)	Held
Sufficiency of notice in indictment	Aggregation language made specific acts unnecessary; indictment gave sufficient notice	Indictment spanned 3+ years and failed to identify specific instances, preventing adequate defense preparation	Reversed trial court; aggregation language plus business records provided sufficient notice
Applicability of Article 21.15 (recklessness pleading)	Not dispositive because indictment also alleged intentional/knowing conduct	Alleging "recklessly" required stating the acts constituting recklessness	Held Article 21.15 does not apply where intentional/knowing also alleged; indictment sufficient
Whether aggregated conduct must list each act	Aggregated offense is single offense; separate acts need not be pled	Needed itemization of each alleged misapplication (dates/transactions)	Court followed Kellar: specifics not required for aggregated theft/misapplication
Preservation (waiver) of indictment-form complaint	Contended Castoreña waived complaint by not objecting before first trial	Argued preserved by motion to quash before retrial	Court reversed on notice ground and declined to decide waiver issue

Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (aggregating language allows charging a single aggregated theft offense without alleging each instance)
Moff v. State, 154 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (indictments requiring specific transactions over a long period discussed; distinguishes non-aggregated charges)
Crawford v. State, 646 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (alleging multiple culpable mental states makes indictment sufficient even if recklessness alone would require more detail)
Rosseau v. State, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (standard that sufficiency of a charging instrument is reviewed de novo)