State v. Castillon., 443 P.3d 98

On November 19, 2015 Officer Tomota stopped Michelle Castillon for expired tags and discovered she did not have a Hawaiʻi driver’s license; she was cited for driving without a license under HRS § 286-102(b).
The State introduced evidence that Castillon’s Hawaiʻi license had been revoked; the DMV examiner testified she could not search Hawaiʻi records for Canadian licensure (and did not testify about Mexico).
Castillon presented no evidence that she possessed a valid Canadian driver’s license or a Mexican commercial license, but argued the State had to prove she was not exempt under HRS § 286-105.
The district court denied her motion for acquittal and convicted her; the ICA agreed the defense must produce evidence before the burden shifts and treated § 286-105 exemptions as defenses rather than elements.
The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s result, holding the § 286-105 exemptions are defenses for which the defendant bears an initial burden to produce “some evidence”; because Castillon produced none, the burden never shifted to the State.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exemptions in HRS § 286-105 are elements (State must disprove) or defenses (defendant must produce evidence)	Exemptions are defenses; defendant must produce some evidence before burden shifts	Exemptions are elements of the offense because § 286-102(a) references § 286-105; State must prove absence of exemption beyond a reasonable doubt	Exemptions are defenses separate from the enacting clause; defendant bears initial burden to produce some evidence; because Castillon produced none, State’s burden did not shift
Whether the rule that exemptions are defenses depends on whether facts are peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge	State: defendant typically must produce evidence first, particularly when facts are within defendant’s control	Castillon: statutory language requires State to disprove exemptions regardless of who controls evidence	Court: the statutory definition of a defense controls; defendant must produce some evidence regardless of whether facts are peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge

State v. Nobriga, 10 Haw. App. 353, 873 P.2d 110 (discusses enacting-clause test and burden allocation between prosecution and defendant)
State v. Lee, 90 Hawaiʽi 130, 976 P.2d 444 (applied enacting-clause test to distinguish elements from statutory exceptions)
State v. Maelega, 80 Hawaiʽi 172, 907 P.2d 758 (defines "some evidence" required to shift burden)
State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 859 P.2d 1369 (definition and application of "some evidence")
State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawaiʽi 87, 997 P.2d 13 (example applying the peculiarly-within-defendant-knowledge principle)