State v. Castaneda, 295 Neb. 547

Background

In 2010 Juan E. Castaneda (15 years, 11 months at the time) was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree felony murder, attempted second-degree murder, attempted robbery, criminal conspiracy, and three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony arising from three separate shootings in Omaha within an hour.
Original sentences included life terms for each murder plus concurrent and partly-consecutive terms for other convictions; on direct appeal the convictions were affirmed but all sentences were vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because Miller v. Alabama required reconsideration of juvenile life terms and the weapon sentences had been improperly ordered concurrent instead of consecutive as required by statute.
On remand a different district judge held a full evidentiary resentencing hearing; defense presented testimony and evaluations addressing youth, maturity, mental health (including a schizophrenia diagnosis), prison behavior, education, and risk assessments; the presentence report documented misconducts and a high-risk score on an assessment tool.
The court resentenced Castaneda to prison terms at the low end of statutory ranges: 40–50 years for each murder, shorter fixed terms for attempted murder, robbery, conspiracy, and weapon counts, ordered largely consecutive such that the aggregate term totaled 105–125 years with credit for time served.
Castaneda appealed, arguing (1) excessive sentences for failure to adequately consider juvenile mitigating factors, (2) the aggregate term is a de facto life sentence violating Miller and the Eighth Amendment, and (3) resentencing was vindictive because sentences became more severe (concurrent to consecutive).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Castaneda)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences	Court failed to adequately consider juvenile factors (age, maturity) and Harrison’s requirement that sentences fit the offender	Court thoroughly considered statutory and case law factors, and sentenced on low end of ranges	No abuse of discretion; court considered required factors and individualized sentencing
Whether aggregate sentence is a de facto life term denying "meaningful opportunity for release" under Miller/Graham	Aggregate 105–125 years denies meaningful opportunity for release and lacked a finding of irreparable corruptness	Sentences are within statutory ranges, on low ends, and Miller allows juvenile life only after individualized consideration; no life-without-parole was imposed	No Miller/Graham violation; resentencing complied with individualized-consideration requirements and did not impose life without parole
Whether resentencing was presumptively vindictive under Pearce because sentences increased in severity	Changing concurrent to consecutive made punishment more severe and therefore presumptively vindictive	Different judge resentenced; no presumption applies and defendant failed to prove actual vindictiveness	No presumption (different judge); no evidence of actual vindictiveness; assignment fails
Whether court erred by running weapon counts consecutively to other counts	(Implicit) original concurrent weapon terms were incorrect per statute	State notes resentencing corrected statutory error and complied with §28-1205(3)	Court properly imposed consecutive weapon sentences consistent with statute

Key Cases Cited

State v. Castaneda, 287 Neb. 289 (affirming convictions; remanding for resentencing under Miller)
State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311 (discussed juvenile life sentences and resentencing)
Mantich v. Nebraska, 287 Neb. 320 (postconviction/resentencing context applied with Miller principles)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile life without parole unconstitutional; requires individualized consideration)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide offenses categorically prohibited; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (presumption of vindictiveness when harsher sentence is imposed on retrial, subject to limits)