State v. Cartwright, 487 P.3d 737

Undercover ICAC detective posed as a 14-year-old girl (“Kaylee”) on the Whisper app and exchanged sexually explicit messages with Thomas Cartwright, who used the handle “Big Bad Wolf 17.”
Cartwright engaged in sexually explicit text and phone contacts, asked about submissiveness, requested sexual role-play language, and invited the purported minor to meet; he acknowledged knowing her age and that it was wrong.
Cartwright walked to a prearranged meeting outside a 7‑11 in extreme weather and was arrested by officers waiting there; his phone contained the chat history.
He was charged under Idaho Code § 18‑1509A (enticing a child via internet), moved to dismiss alleging the statute is facially overbroad under the First Amendment, and sought a jury instruction on entrapment; both motions were denied.
The jury convicted Cartwright; he appealed arguing (1) § 18‑1509A is facially overbroad because it incorporates broad definitions from § 18‑1506 and (2) the court erred by refusing an entrapment instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Cartwright)	Held
Whether I.C. § 18‑1509A is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	§ 18‑1509A targets knowingly enticing minors to engage in sexual acts via electronic communications and, read with § 18‑1506, is narrowly focused on proscribable conduct	Incorporation of § 18‑1506 criminalizes any photographing or physical contact with a minor (given the intent element), potentially criminalizing protected expression or thoughts	Statute is not facially overbroad: construed together § 18‑1509A requires knowing use of internet to entice a minor for sexual conduct, so it does not substantially chill protected speech
Whether the court erred by refusing to give an entrapment instruction	Undercover messages were at most opportunities or open‑ended suggestions; there is no substantial evidence the state implanted criminal intent in a not‑inclined defendant	The detective’s sexual innuendo and conduct induced Cartwright to commit the offense; entrapment instruction warranted	No error: evidence showed Cartwright was predisposed from the outset (knew age, expressed sexual intent, continued solicitation), so entrapment not supported

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1973) (overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” to be used only as last resort)
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 272 P.3d 382 (Idaho 2012) (two‑part overbreadth test: regulates protected conduct and substantiality of that regulation)
State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 896 P.2d 357 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (statute not overbroad where it criminalizes phone calls with proscribable intent)
State v. Bonner, 138 Idaho 254, 61 P.3d 611 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (struck similar photographic‑recording language as overbroad)
State v. Ingram, 138 Idaho 768, 69 P.3d 188 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (explains entrapment requires inducement of an otherwise not‑inclined person)
State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishes inducement from furnishing opportunity)
State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 924 P.2d 1230 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (definition and limits of entrapment doctrine)
State v. Sanchez, 165 Idaho 563, 448 P.3d 991 (Idaho 2019) (review standards and presumption of constitutionality)
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (Idaho 2009) (jury instruction correctness depends on supporting evidence)
State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 297 P.3d 252 (Idaho 2013) (same rule on when instruction is warranted)