State v. Carter, 535 P.3d 819

Douglas Carter admitted starting a fire that heavily damaged a long-unoccupied house that belonged to a relative; he was charged with aggravated arson (first-degree felony).
Aggravated arson required damaging a “habitable structure”; the statute then defined that term by reference to structures "used for lodging or assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is actually present or not."
At trial the State’s fire marshal expert testified the house was "habitable;" defense counsel did not object but cross-examined the marshal about what he meant.
The district court declined the defense’s proposed jury instruction that would have required actual ongoing use (i.e., being lived in) and instead gave the statutory definition, allowing counsel to argue its meaning to the jury.
Defense counsel did not move for a directed verdict at the close of evidence; the jury convicted Carter of aggravated arson. On appeal Carter argued his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to move for a directed verdict based on his statutory interpretation of "habitable," and (2) failing to object to the expert’s alleged impermissible legal conclusion. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not filing a directed verdict motion asserting the statute required ongoing use (actual occupancy)	State: Motion would have been futile given the district court already rejected that interpretation; reasonable counsel could instead present the issue to the jury.	Carter: Reasonable counsel would have moved for directed verdict because no evidence of ongoing use existed; failure was deficient.	Court: Counsel’s decision was objectively reasonable under Strickland; declining the motion to preserve the chance to argue to the jury was a permissible strategic choice.
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the fire marshal’s testimony that the house was "habitable" (alleged improper legal conclusion)	State: Cross-examination was a reasonable tactic; counsel elicited limiting testimony and used it in closing to support defense theory.	Carter: The expert’s statement was an impermissible ultimate-issue/legal conclusion and leaving it unobjected prejudiced the defense.	Court: Assuming the testimony was improper, it was not objectively unreasonable to address it by cross-examining rather than objecting; no Strickland deficiency shown.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test)
State v. Gallegos, 463 P.3d 641 (Utah 2020) (warning against allowing shorthand rationales to supplant Strickland analysis)
State v. Scott, 462 P.3d 350 (Utah 2020) (discusses objective-reasonableness in counsel-performance review)
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) (addresses permissible scope of expert testimony touching on legal terms)
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (discusses limits on expert testimony using statutory terms)