State v. Carter, 504 P.3d 179

In October 2018 a vacant house (previously a family home) burned twice; the second fire (three days after the first) was more destructive and was determined by the fire marshal to have been intentionally set with gasoline.
Carter lived two houses away; police found matches and a gas can at his property, and he ultimately admitted starting the second fire.
The sole contested issue at trial was whether the burned building qualified as a “habitable structure” under Utah Code § 76-6-101(1)(b)—the difference between aggravated arson (first-degree) and arson (second-degree).
The district court refused the defense’s proposed jury instruction that “habitable structure” requires actual/current use for lodging, and instead read the statutory definition to the jury while allowing both sides to argue its meaning.
The State’s expert (fire marshal) testified on direct that, in his opinion, the house was a habitable structure; defense counsel did not object but elicited on cross-examination that the house was vacant and that the marshal’s view was about capability to be lived in.
The jury convicted Carter of aggravated arson; on appeal Carter alleged ineffective assistance for (1) failing to object to the marshal’s alleged legal conclusion and (2) failing to move for a directed verdict based on the defense’s statutory interpretation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the fire marshal’s testimony that the house was a "habitable structure"	Carter: failing to object allowed an expert to state an impermissible legal conclusion and broaden the statutory meaning	State: counsel reasonably cross‑examined the marshal and limited the testimony; objection was not required and strategy to expose vacancy was reasonable	Court: No deficient performance — counsel reasonably used cross‑examination and closing argument to neutralize the marshal’s testimony rather than objecting
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict when the State rested	Carter: counsel should have moved because the State presented no evidence of ongoing use required by Carter’s interpretation of the statute	State: a directed‑verdict motion would have been futile given the court’s earlier refusal to adopt the defense instruction; foregoing it was reasonable	Court: No ineffective assistance — directed‑verdict motion would have been futile and counsel had reasonable strategic reasons to forgo it (concurring judge elaborates); dissent would have reversed

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Scott, 462 P.3d 350 (2020) (judge assesses counsel’s acts for objective reasonableness under all circumstances)
State v. Ray, 469 P.3d 871 (2020) (errors or omissions do not automatically require relief; strategic choices can be reasonable)
State v. Makaya, 476 P.3d 1025 (2020) (futile motion defeats deficiency and prejudice under Strickland)
State v. Baer, 438 P.3d 979 (2019) (forgoing a futile directed‑verdict motion is not deficient performance)
Layton City v. Carr, 336 P.3d 587 (2014) (standard for considering ineffective assistance raised first on appeal)
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (2011) (prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would differ)