State v. Carter, 150 A.3d 327

In 2014 a Penobscot County elementary school found a 13-year-old student communicating with adult men on a school iPad; a police sergeant took over the account and posed as the girl (“Samantha”).
Russell W. Carter (age 31) exchanged hundreds of messages with the account in March–April 2014 in which he repeatedly solicited sexual acts and arranged two in-person meetings (April 6 and April 20) but did not appear.
Carter was charged in June 2014 with solicitation of a child to commit a prohibited act, 17-A M.R.S. § 259-A(1)(A), pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to a bench trial (jury waived).
After the State rested, Carter moved to dismiss for improper venue and argued the affirmative defense of renunciation; the trial court denied both and found him guilty, sentencing him to a suspended six-month jail term and one year probation.
The court also noted that Carter must register as a sex offender for ten years; Carter appealed challenging venue, the availability of the renunciation defense, and sufficiency of the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Carter)	Held
Availability of renunciation defense	§154 applies only to chapter 7 offenses and does not include §259-A solicitation of a child, so renunciation is unavailable	Renunciation under 17-A M.R.S. §154 should apply; exclusion of §259-A was oversight and defense available	Renunciation in §154 is limited to chapter 7 offenses (attempt, solicitation under §153, conspiracy); not available for §259-A solicitation of a child — court affirmed denial
Sufficiency of evidence of intent	Messages arranging meetings, discussed excuses, vehicle, time/place and insistence on meeting show intent to engage in prohibited acts	No competent proof of intent because Carter never met Samantha in person	Evidence was sufficient: solicitation and arrangements supported an inference of intent beyond reasonable doubt; failure to meet did not negate intent
Venue (motion to dismiss)	Venue proper (trial court)	Venue improper	Court denied motion; appellate court found Carter’s venue argument unpersuasive and did not further address it
Legislative intent / oversight argument about §154	Plain statutory language controls; Legislature could have amended §154 when enacting §259-A but did not	§259-A enacted later; omission of §259-A from §154 was likely legislative oversight, so renunciation should still apply	Court refused to consider extratextual intent because §154 is textually unambiguous; omission stands

State v. Hayden, 86 A.3d 1221 (Me. 2014) (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to State)
State v. Graham, 113 A.3d 1102 (Me. 2015) (de novo review of statutory application of affirmative defenses)
State v. Tozier, 115 A.3d 1240 (Me. 2015) (interpretation of plain statutory language; only consider legislative intent if ambiguous)
State v. Woodard, 68 A.3d 1250 (Me. 2013) (solicitation: evidence of arrangements and communications can support intent to commit sexual acts)
Joyce v. State, 951 A.2d 69 (Me. 2008) (legislature’s retention of statutory language indicates intent not to change it)