84 So. 3d 499
La.2012Background
- Terrance Carter was indicted on July 19, 2006, for first-degree murder of Corinthian Houston in Red River Parish.
- Venue was moved to Lincoln Parish due to pre-trial publicity; sequestered jurors were brought back to Red River Parish for trial.
- Jury found Carter guilty of first-degree murder; penalty phase yielded a unanimous death recommendation after aggravating- and victim-age findings.
- Carter moved for a new trial; after initially withdrawing portions of the motion, the Second Circuit remanded for capacity and withdrawal issues; trial court later allowed withdrawal and imposed death sentence.
- The appeal asserts 25 assignments of error plus 3 supplemental assignments, with the most significant challenges relating to conflict of interest, admission of a police-officer’s credibility notes, and the withdrawal of the motion for a new trial.
- The court affirms the conviction and death sentence after reviewing the arguments, the record, and related appendix materials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict of interest prevention | Carter argues potential conflict because co-counsel was under criminal investigation | Risk of conflict not adequately mitigated; waiver not knowing or intelligent | No actual conflict proven; waiver not required; trial court properly relied on inquiry and evidence. |
| Admission of officer’s credibility notes | Notes in transcript communicated officer’s impressions of credibility | Notes improper as commenting on credibility and containing micro-expressions | Notes treated as non-credibility-imputing observations; admissible as lay observations under La.C.E. 701. |
| Withdrawal of motion for new trial | State argues withdrawal was permissible after competency findings | Withdrawal violated due process; Faretta-like rights; required sanity commission | No due-process violation; defendant competent; withdrawal valid under trial court’s inquiry; no Faretta waiver needed. |
| Attorney-client privilege at motion | Co-counsel testimony violated privilege | Privilege should bar disclosure of communications | No privileged communications improperly admitted; testimony fell within exceptions and work-product/privacy rules. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (conflict of interest requires showing actual conflict or prejudice)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1978) (conflicts of interest and effective assistance considerations)
- State v. Cisco, 861 So.2d 118 (La. 2003) (conflicts of interest; need for adequate inquiry and proper waiver)
- State v. Tart, 672 So.2d 116 (La. 1996) (conflict of interest and waivers; Holloway/Tart framework)
- State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475 (La. 1983) (actual conflict defined by conflicting duties; proof by record)
- Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979) (definitional framework for actual conflict of interest)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (right to represent oneself; Faretta inquiry standards)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (U.S. 1938) (intelligent waiver of counsel requires knowing understanding of consequences)
