State v. Carrillo, 466 P.3d 1023

Background

Carrillo and A lived together for years after divorce; A alleged repeated domestic violence across multiple incidents from 2014–2016, including two incidents involving discharged bullets in their bedroom.
After A reported the last incident, police (with A’s consent) searched the master bedroom, found bullet holes in bedding and carpet, and seized those items and personal effects.
Carrillo was indicted on numerous counts (UUW, menacing, assault, coercion, strangulation) arising from six incidents; he was tried to the bench and convicted on 16 counts.
Pretrial, Carrillo moved to suppress bedroom evidence arguing A lacked authority to consent; the trial court denied the motion.
The state introduced testimony about Carrillo’s uncharged prior abuse of a former partner B under OEC 404(3); Carrillo objected.
At the close of the state’s case Carrillo moved for judgment of acquittal on Counts 15 and 18 (UUW), arguing the state failed to prove the discharges occurred within urban growth boundaries (UGB); the trial court denied the motion. On appeal the court affirmed suppression and admission rulings but reversed Counts 15 and 18 for insufficient evidence of the UGB element and remanded for resentencing.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Carrillo's Argument	Held
Did A have actual authority to consent to search/seizure of the bedroom and bedding?	A was a long-term cohabitant with shared use and control of bedroom/bed; her consent was valid.	Title and divorce award put ownership in Carrillo; A lacked authority to consent.	Denial of suppression affirmed — evidence supported common authority over bedroom/bed; seizures lawful (plain view/seizable crime evidence).
Was testimony about prior acts against B admissible under OEC 404(3) (motive/hostility)?	Evidence showed hostile motive toward intimate partners and was admissible for non-character purpose.	Testimony was improper propensity evidence and prejudicial.	Assuming error, admission was harmless given bench trial, extensive corroborating evidence against Carrillo, limited reliance by state, and trial court’s self-limiting rulings.
Did the state prove the UUW element that discharges occurred within urban growth boundaries (Counts 15 & 18)?	The indictment omitted the UGB element; the state relied on trial proof and argued procedural challenges to indictment belonged in a demurrer.	No evidence at trial established that the discharges occurred within an urban growth boundary.	Reversed convictions on Counts 15 and 18 — state failed to prove the UGB element; judgment of acquittal should have been entered on those counts.
Does an omission of a material element from an indictment bar a defendant from moving for judgment of acquittal on that element?	Challenges to indictment sufficiency are typically raised by demurrer (Hankins), not by motion for acquittal.	A motion for judgment of acquittal is a proper vehicle to test sufficiency of the evidence on an element omitted in the indictment.	Court held defendant could challenge sufficiency of evidence via judgment of acquittal; omission in indictment did not relieve state of proving the element.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212 (defines state’s burden to prove third-party consent to search)
State v. Jenkins, 179 Or. App. 92 (common authority based on mutual use, not legal title)
State v. Voyles, 280 Or. App. 579 (distinguishes authority to consent to searches of premises from authority to consent to seizure of others’ property)
State v. Sargent, 323 Or. 455 (plain-view seizure doctrine permits taking clearly incriminating items observed during lawful entry)
State v. Hankins, 342 Or. 258 (procedural rule that demurrer is the usual vehicle to challenge indictment sufficiency)
State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19 (harmless-error standard: error is harmless if it likely did not affect verdict)