State v. Carrick, 458 P.3d 1167

Background

Carrick had an extramarital relationship with the decedent (Wife) and attended her funeral; multiple witnesses saw him wearing a distinctive feathered cowboy hat.
After the funeral two neighbors saw a man wearing that hat remove a garage window screen, crawl into the attached garage, then leave the same way; other witnesses later identified Carrick from his driver’s license photo.
Police contacted Carrick by phone; he declined to give a statement and hung up. Husband checked the house and noticed golf clubs moved but reported nothing missing.
Carrick was charged with second‑degree burglary (intent to commit theft). At trial the jury was instructed on burglary and the lesser included criminal trespass; the court defined only “knowingly,” not “intentionally” or “recklessly.”
Defense presented four alibi witnesses and Carrick testified; he was convicted. On appeal Carrick challenged (1) denial of his directed‑verdict motion, (2) admission of a prior inconsistent statement as hearsay, (3) jury instructions for culpable mental states, and (4) various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A Rule 23B remand developed facts about counsel’s investigation.

Issues

Issue	Carrick's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency / Directed verdict — intent to commit theft	Evidence was insufficient to prove he entered with intent to steal; no one saw him carrying anything.	Circumstantial evidence (affair motive, covert window entry/exit, haste, timing after funeral) allowed a reasonable jury to infer intent.	Denial of directed verdict affirmed; some evidence supported submission to the jury.
Hearsay — admission of Husband’s testimony about Celeste’s statement	Husband’s testimony was hearsay and inadmissible when used substantively to show intent.	Statement was a prior inconsistent statement by Celeste (she denied it on cross) and was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A); such statements may be used substantively.	Admission proper: treated as prior inconsistent statement and admissible.
Jury instructions / plain error — failure to define "intent" and "reckless"	Omitted statutory definitions were plain error and prejudicial.	Defense counsel affirmatively waived objections at trial; invited error doctrine bars plain‑error review.	No plain‑error review because counsel expressly approved instructions; claim rejected.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (four complaints: failing to object to instructions; not presenting garage passcode; not investigating additional alibi witnesses; not investigating Cousin as suspect)	Trial counsel’s omissions were deficient and prejudicial; any would likely have produced a different result.	Either counsel’s performance was reasonable (presented four alibi witnesses) or Carrick cannot show prejudice given eyewitness evidence and other record facts.	All ineffective‑assistance claims denied: either no deficient performance or no demonstrated prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Gonzalez, 345 P.3d 1168 (Utah 2015) (standard of review for directed‑verdict rulings)
State v. Montoya, 84 P.3d 1183 (Utah 2004) (sufficiency review: draw all reasonable inferences supporting jury verdict)
State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961) (intent may be inferred from conduct and circumstances)
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) (examples of circumstantial evidence bearing on intent)
State v. Robertson, 122 P.3d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (window entry and flight can support inference of intent to steal)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)