State v. Carlisle, 515 P.3d 867

Incident outside a Portland bar: victim AM had her bra pulled down and her breast touched; she identified defendant Zachary Carlisle as the toucher.
Defendant was tried for third-degree sexual abuse (ORS 163.415(1)(a)(A)); he was also convicted of harassment (only the sexual-abuse conviction is at issue).
At trial Carlisle requested a jury instruction that the state must prove he knew the victim did not consent; the court instead instructed that the state need only prove Carlisle was criminally negligent as to the victim’s nonconsent.
The jury convicted; the Court of Appeals affirmed. Carlisle appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court challenging the culpable mental state instruction for the “victim does not consent” element.
The Supreme Court reviewed statutory text, the Criminal Code’s general culpability provisions, and legislative history from the 1971 Criminal Code enactment and affirmed: the legislature did not intend a knowing mental state as to factual nonconsent for ORS 163.415.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Carlisle)	Held
Whether ORS 163.415(1)(a)(A)’s “victim does not consent” element requires proof the defendant knew the victim did not consent	The statute does not require knowledge of nonconsent; a lesser culpable state (criminal negligence) suffices	The state must prove defendant knew the victim did not consent ("knowing" mental state)	Held: The legislature did not intend a knowing mental state as to the victim’s factual nonconsent; criminal negligence is sufficient
Whether the default “conduct→knowing / circumstance→criminally negligent” rule from the Code controls here	State: contextual statutes and 1971 legislative scheme show the legislature did not require knowing for factual nonconsent	Defendant: Simonov/Haltom default rule requires treating lack of consent as a conduct element, so knowing required	Held: The conduct/circumstance categorization was indeterminate from 1971 materials; court relied on broader textual and contextual indicia (including ORS 163.325’s treatment of legal nonconsent) and concluded knowing was not required

PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 317 Or. 606 (sets out statutory-construction framework applied)
State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531 (explains conduct vs. circumstance and default culpability rules)
State v. Haltom, 366 Or. 791 (earlier sexual-offense decision addressing nonconsent; distinguished here)
State v. Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. 507 (interprets “does not consent” to include capacity-based nonconsent)
State v. Owen, 369 Or. 288 (discusses the Criminal Code culpability provisions and minimum mental states)
State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (cited for statutory-construction principles)