State v. Cardenas-Flores
93385-5
| Wash. | Aug 17, 2017Background
- In December 2013, infant C.A. was brought to the hospital with a displaced femur fracture; earlier X‑rays after an alleged rollover showed no fracture, and doctors concluded the injury was recent and likely nonaccidental.
- Zaida Cardenas‑Flores initially gave varying explanations to police and ultimately confessed to forcefully pushing/straightening the child’s left leg; at trial she recanted, claiming the confession was false.
- The State charged her with second‑degree child assault; a jury convicted and the trial court sentenced her to 31 months.
- On appeal, Cardenas‑Flores argued the State failed to prove the corpus delicti (i.e., independent evidence corroborating her confession); the Court of Appeals held the claim was waived for failure to object at trial.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether an unpreserved corpus delicti challenge may be raised on appeal and (2) whether the evidence and jury instructions were sufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cardenas‑Flores) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May corpus delicti be raised for the first time on appeal? | Corpus delicti is a sufficiency rule per State v. Dow; can be raised on appeal. | Corpus delicti is an evidentiary/admissibility rule and is waived if not raised at trial. | Corpus delicti pertains to sufficiency (as well as admissibility) and may be raised for the first time on appeal. |
| Did the State present independent evidence establishing corpus delicti? | Medical and circumstantial evidence did not sufficiently show a criminal cause independent of the confession. | X‑rays, medical testimony about timing/force, and lack of alternative explanation prima facie establish nonaccidental trauma. | Held for the State: independent, prima facie evidence supported corpus delicti. |
| Was there sufficient evidence to convict of second‑degree child assault? | Even if corpus delicti satisfied, evidence did not prove Cardenas‑Flores intentionally committed the touching that caused harm. | Her inculpatory statements plus medical evidence support intent to commit the physical act (battery) and resulting substantial bodily harm. | Held for the State: evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient. |
| Were the jury instructions erroneous by allowing conviction of a parent for an intentional touching that caused harm? | A parent’s lawful intentional touching should be excepted; instruction should require proof of unlawful force/criminal intent. | Standard WPIC instructions correctly defined assault by battery (intent to do the physical act suffices); no claim of lawful force was made. | Held for the State: instructions were adequate and not reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243 (Wash. 2010) (corpus delicti operates as both admissibility and sufficiency rule; independent corroboration required to support conviction)
- State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640 (Wash. 1996) (corpus delicti "permeates" sufficiency review; confession alone insufficient)
- State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311 (Wash. 2006) (explains Washington’s corroboration requirement for confessions)
- Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (U.S. 1954) (federal "trustworthiness" standard for corroboration of confessions)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (due‑process sufficiency standard: whether any rational trier of fact could convict)
- State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (Wash. 1992) (standard for appellate sufficiency review)