2020 Ohio 1401
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- Aaron Candy was indicted for fourth-degree felony nonsupport for failing to pay child support from March 10, 2010 to May 26, 2012; a warrant was executed and he initially pled not guilty.
- On December 27, 2018 Candy entered a guilty plea under a plea agreement: pay $4,689.17 restitution by sentencing date in exchange for the State recommending community control.
- At the February 7, 2019 sentencing date Candy sought to withdraw his plea; counsel Mulligan opposed but later filed a motion to withdraw the plea and appeared at a March hearing that Candy did not attend.
- The trial court denied the presentence motion to withdraw the plea, finding Candy had been fully advised under Crim.R.11, was familiar with the system, failed to pay the agreed restitution, and presented no documentation showing payments for the indicted period.
- Mulligan later withdrew; Candy was sentenced on July 26, 2019 to 16 months’ imprisonment. A Miami County child-support audit showed no payments during 2010–2012 and a substantial arrearage; Candy provided no records proving payments for that period.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Candy’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea | State: denial proper because Crim.R.11 colloquy was complete, Candy understood charges/penalties, failed to pay restitution required by plea, and produced no proof of payments | Candy: sought withdrawal because he had legal defenses and documentary proof (pay records from employers) showing payments during the indicted period | Denied. Court did not abuse discretion—most Fish factors weigh against withdrawal; audit showed no payments and Candy produced no supporting documentation |
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by refusing to advocate plea withdrawal and delaying filing | State: Mulligan filed the withdrawal motion, appeared at the hearing, negotiated a favorable plea (community control recommendation and reduced restitution), and any failure to present evidence was due to Candy’s nonappearance and lack of documents | Candy: Mulligan told court he would not pursue withdrawal, delayed and later sought to withdraw as counsel, depriving Candy of effective advocacy | Denied. No deficient performance shown; counsel’s conduct fell within reasonable professional conduct and produced beneficial plea terms |
| Whether Candy’s guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to inadequate advisement about post-release control penalties | State: trial court fully advised Candy of post-release control length and consequences; plea form explained post-release control and was signed by Candy and counsel; Candy acknowledged understanding | Candy: claimed he did not understand post-release-control consequences (specifically the possible 50% imprisonment exposure for violations) at plea entry | Denied. Court’s Crim.R.11 colloquy and signed plea form satisfied advisement requirements and Candy showed no prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992) (presentence motions to withdraw plea should be liberally allowed but are subject to trial-court discretion)
- State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236 (1st Dist. 1995) (sets multi-factor test for evaluating presentence plea-withdrawal motions)
- State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977) (appellate review of plea-withdrawal denials is for abuse of discretion)
- AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157 (1990) (defines "abuse of discretion")
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty pleas must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary)
- State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 (2008) (Crim.R.11 substantial-compliance analysis for nonconstitutional advisements)
- State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156 (2018) (requires strict compliance for constitutional plea advisements)
- State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106 (1990) (explains "totality of the circumstances" test for substantial compliance)