State v. Campbell, 120 A.3d 1148

In March 2006 Campbell assaulted and sexually assaulted a young man after heavy drinking; charged with sexual assault, aggravated assault, and violation of conditions of release.
After a vacated plea and resentencing process, Campbell pled guilty to the two assault counts; a PSI and psycho-sexual evaluation were ordered.
Campbell objected pre-sentencing to two special sex-offender probation conditions proposed in the PSI: Condition 42 (periodic polygraph exams, paid by defendant) and Condition 44 (requirement to reside/work only where approved by PO).
At sentencing the court clarified Condition 42 would be used investigatively (not as evidentiary proof) and that inability to pay would not be a violation; the court added “approval shall not be unreasonably withheld” to Condition 44.
Court sentenced Campbell to seven to thirty years (all suspended but seven), imposed multiple standard and sex-offender conditions, and Campbell appealed the two challenged conditions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Campbell)	Held
Validity of polygraph condition (Cond. 42)	Polygraph testing is an authorized, investigative tool that assists probation supervision and rehabilitation.	Polygraph results are unreliable and inadmissible; therefore the condition serves no legitimate rehabilitative or public-safety purpose and may be unfair.	Affirmed — periodic polygraph testing for investigatory/nonevidentiary use is reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety; statute expressly authorizes it; inability to pay cannot be basis for revocation.
Validity of residence/work approval (Cond. 44 — work component)	Approval requirement is reasonably related to rehabilitation/public safety in context of alcohol-fueled sexual assault.	The approval-for-employment clause is overbroad, grants unfettered discretion to the PO, and is unduly restrictive absent specific findings or standards.	Partially affirmed/remanded — residence portion stands (preapproved here); employment-approval provision is overbroad and unduly restrictive and must be justified, narrowed, or struck by the trial court.

Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 46 A.3d 891 (Vt. 2012) (polygraph evidence has limited probative value and may be prejudicial in jury trials)
State v. Freeman, 70 A.3d 1008 (Vt. 2013) (upheld investigatory polygraph probation condition language; cautioned against imposing broad PO-approval conditions without findings)
State v. Moses, 618 A.2d 478 (Vt. 1992) (probation conditions must be reasonably related and not unduly restrictive; court cannot delegate power to create conditions to PO without guidance)
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1998) (polygraphs have valid nonevidentiary uses such as personnel screening and investigative purposes)
State v. Nelson, 742 A.2d 1248 (Vt. 1999) (trial court’s discretion to impose probation conditions is broad and will be upheld if reasonably related to the offense)
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997) (rules of evidence do not bar law-enforcement use of polygraph tests for investigative purposes)