State v. Campbell, 2022 Ohio 3626

Daniel Campbell was released to community control after judicial release and signed conditions that he "consent[ed] to searches of my person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time without a warrant."
A probation officer conducted a random home check while training new officers; she had no reasonable grounds or suspicion that Campbell was violating the law or his supervision terms.
During the home check the officer inspected Campbell’s cell phone and found child pornography; that discovery led to seizure of additional devices and felony charges.
Campbell moved to suppress; the trial court denied suppression and he pleaded no contest. The Fifth District reversed, finding a statutory violation of R.C. 2951.02(A) and ordering suppression.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: it held there was no Fourth Amendment violation (consent condition covered property including the phone), there was a statutory violation of R.C. 2951.02(A) (no reasonable grounds), but the exclusionary rule does not apply to statutory violations absent a legislative mandate, so the evidence remained admissible.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Campbell)	Held
Whether a suspicionless search of a probationer’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment	Campbell consented to warrantless searches of his property as a condition of community control; precedent permits suspicionless searches of parolees/probationers	Cell phones are distinct and contain high privacy interests; the consent language was not clear and unambiguous as to cell-phone contents	No Fourth Amendment violation: consent-to-search condition and probation status eliminated a protected expectation of privacy in the phone
Whether the probation officer was authorized under R.C. 2951.02(A) to conduct the search without reasonable grounds	Consent condition authorizes searches; officer acted within supervisory duties	R.C. 2951.02(A) requires "reasonable grounds" to search; officer had none	Statutory violation: officer exceeded authority under R.C. 2951.02(A) because she lacked reasonable grounds
Whether the evidence must be suppressed because of the statutory violation	Exclusionary rule enforces constitutional, not statutory, violations; absent legislative mandate suppression is improper	Statutory violation should suppress evidence; good-faith exception does not save admission	Exclusionary rule does not apply to statutory violations alone; evidence admissible; court of appeals’ suppression reversed

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (upholding suspicionless search of parolee who had consented to searches)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (probation search condition significantly diminishes expectation of privacy)
State v. Benton, 82 Ohio St.3d 316 (Ohio: random search of parolee who consented to warrantless searches was not a Fourth Amendment violation)
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell-phone data generally requires a warrant because of heightened privacy interests)
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not enforce state-law violations)
United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir.) (cell-phone search suppressed where supervision terms did not clearly and unambiguously include phones)
United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir.) (consent to search "property" did not clearly encompass a cell phone)
Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232 (Ohio: exclusionary rule applies to constitutional violations only)